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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Top management teams (TMTs) make strategic decisions that determine the shape 
and direction of the firms (e.g., Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 
1999). During the decision making process, top executives with diverse values, 
knowledge bases, and experiences are likely to have different perspectives regarding the 
optimal strategic choices firms should pursue (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 
1997b). As a result, conflict may emerge as TMT members interact with each other in the 
course of making strategic decisions (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1997a; Simons 
et al., 1999). Conflict is particularly prevalent within the TMTs of high-technology firms, 
because top executives embedded in such dynamic environments, compared to those in 
stable environments, are more likely to confront overwhelming and ambiguous 
information inputs (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993), interpret them primarily from their 
own background perspectives (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and, therefore, propose conflicting 
viewpoints during decision making. In this dissertation, therefore, I examine TMT 
conflict in a setting of high-technology industries.  
TMT conflict, defined as an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, 
disagreement, or dissonance among top executives while making decisions (Boulding, 
1963; Jehn & Mannix, 2001), affects TMT and firm outcomes. On the one hand, conflict 
may help TMTs develop a more complete understanding of strategic choices, create a 
wider range of options, and make higher quality strategic decisions; consequently, 
conflict may lead to more favorable TMT and firm performance (Eisenhardt et al., 1997b; 
Simons et al., 1997). For instance, Eisenhardt et al.’s (1997b) study of 12 high-
technology firms found that those firms with a high level of conflict during the TMT 
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decision making process tended to have better financial performance than others. On the 
other hand, conflict can be detrimental because it may limit team cohesiveness, cost 
energy and resources, and, therefore, impair TMT and firm outcomes (e.g., Amason, 
1996; March & Simon, 1958). For example, with the data of 76 TMTs of high-
technology firms, Knight, Pearce, Smith, Olian, Sims, Smith, & Flood (1999) observed 
that TMT conflict adversely affected strategic consensus.  
It is important to identify the antecedent conditions through which TMT conflict 
emerges (Amason, 1996; Eisenhardt et al., 1997a). Team diversity variables such as age 
diversity, gender diversity, race diversity, value diversity, tenure diversity, functional 
background diversity, educational diversity, and informational diversity have been 
addressed as the antecedents to conflict in the literature (e.g., Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 
1999; Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weinart, 2001; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).  While the 
observed effects of other diversity variables have fluctuated across studies, informational 
diversity has been consistently argued as a dominant predictor to conflict (Jehn et al., 
1999; Lovelace et al., 2001). Informational diversity refers to the diverse knowledge 
bases and experiences of team members that they draw upon in making decisions (Jehn et 
al., 1999). For instance, In Jehn et al.’s (1999) study with 92 work teams in the household 
goods moving industry, they found that conflict was more likely to emerge when a high 
level of informational diversity was present. Such a finding was further confirmed by 
other studies of work teams (e.g., Lovelace et al., 2001; Pelled et al., 1999).  
However, informational diversity has yet to be addressed in the context of firms’ 
upper echelons. It is important to advance the empirical investigation of information 
diversity into the TMT context because of the following reasons: (1) TMTs have distinct 
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task nature, team composition, structure and team processes separate from those of work 
teams (Ancona & Nadler, 1989; Mintzberg, 1971). In particular, the fundamental tasks 
for top management teams (TMTs) are to make strategic decisions, which are much more 
complex than those for other types of teams because they involves the creation of 
favorable decision making context (e.g., appropriate organizational structure), thorough 
examinations of internal operations, and complicated information processing of external 
environmental elements such as customer demand, competitor move, technology trend, 
and market dynamics as well (Mintzberg, 1971; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Therefore, it 
is risky simply to project  the findings of the studies of work teams onto the TMT level 
(Cohen & Bailey, 1997); (2) diverse knowledge and experiences composition is natural to 
the TMTs of high-technology firms (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996); and (3) the 
associations between TMT diversity (e.g., informational diversity) and TMT process 
variables (e.g., conflict) have been largely ignored and remain unknown in TMT 
research, which accounts for the ambiguity regarding how TMTs affect firm performance 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims, O’bannon, & Scully, 1994).  
Another diversity variable that deserves research attention is TMT power 
centralization (Priem, Lyon, & Dess, 1999). TMTs are the power nexus of firms, and are 
likely to involve salient power differences among top executives (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). Power centralization refers to the extent to which the levels of 
influences over strategic decisions within a TMT are centered on the CEO or a few “core 
executives” instead of evenly distributed among all the TMT members (Bunderson, 2002; 
Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996)). The more disproportionably the 
power is consolidated on the CEO or a few “core executives”, the higher the level of 
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power centralization. Several TMT studies have indicated the likely important effects of 
power centralization on conflict (Pitcher & Smith, 2001; Priem et al., 1999). For instance, 
in a case study of a financial service corporation, Pitcher and Smith (2001) observed that 
the more opportunities other top executives besides the CEO were deeply involved in 
making strategic decisions, in other words, the lower the level of power centralization - 
the greater the likelihood that decision making would be typified by a high level of open 
debate and discussion as opposed to a hierarchically driven decision.  However, no 
empirical study has explicitly addressed such a relationship. Therefore, the first research 
goal of this dissertation is to examine the effects of TMT informational diversity and 
power centralization on TMT conflict. The first research question is this: How do TMT 
informational diversity and TMT power centralization affect TMT conflict? 
As noted, conflict has been observed as being both beneficial and detrimental 
(Amason, 1996; Knight et al., 1999). Recent studies have attributed the mixed effects of 
conflict to its multidimensional nature. Cognitive conflict is task-related and arises from 
differences in judgment or perspectives; affective conflict, however, is emotional and 
arises from personalized incompatibility or clashes (Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Simons 
& Peterson, 2000). A relatively high level of cognitive conflict appears to improve 
strategic decision making and therefore TMT and firm outcomes by stimulating different 
perspectives and promoting critical examinations of the decision making criteria 
(Amason, 1996; Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Affective conflict appears to impair TMT and 
firm performance, because it limits team cohesiveness and interferes with the TMT 
decision making (Amason, 1996; Simons & Peterson, 2000).  Affective conflict may 
confound the effects of cognitive conflict as well. When a high correlation between 
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affective conflict and cognitive conflict is present, cognitive conflict may turn to 
negatively affect team and firm outcomes (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003).  
This research suggests that to optimize TMT decision making, it is important to 
establish a constructive conflict profile, namely, one with a relatively high level of 
cognitive conflict, but with a low level of or little affective conflict. However, such a 
process is not straightforward, because these two types of conflict are highly coupled 
(Amason, 1996; Simons & Peterson, 2000). Simons and Peterson (2000) reviewed 
previous empirical conflict research and found that cognitive conflict and affective 
conflict were positively related across studies.  A high level of cognitive conflict may 
lead to the emergence of affective conflict because harsh language that is often generated 
during a task-related debate may be taken as personal attacks by other team members 
(e.g., Jehn, 1995). Furthermore, affective conflict may contribute to cognitive conflict as 
well. Individuals who feel angry with other members of the team may have a greater 
propensity to openly dispute the ideas of those other members (Pelled et al., 1999).   
Thus far, we know little about how a TMT is able to establish a constructive 
conflict profile (Except Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Simons & Peterson, 2000). With a 
study of 48 food processing firms, Amason and Sapienza (1997) found that TMT 
openness, defined as a team’s propensity to tolerate, encourage, and engage in open, 
frank expression of views, was positively related to TMT cognitive conflict but 
negatively associated with TMT affective conflict. Despite their contributions, an 
examination of the direct relationship between openness and conflict did not provide 
solutions to conflict decoupling. Basing their study on 70 TMTs of US-based hotels, 
Simons and Peterson (2000) suggested that when a high level of intrateam trust was 
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present in a TMT, cognitive conflict was less likely to lead to affective conflict. 
Unfortunately, they did not address how to further encourage cognitive conflict at the 
same time while minimizing affective conflict. Therefore, the second research question is 
this: How can a TMT establish a constructive conflict profile, namely one with a 
relatively high level of TMT cognitive conflict and a low level of or little TMT affective 
conflict simultaneously?  
Recent research has suggested looking into the role that CEOs play for solutions 
to establishing a constructive TMT conflict profile (Eisenhardt et al., 1997a). As the 
central members of TMTs (Jackson, 1992), CEOs are not only responsible for 
envisioning a strategic direction for other team members, but can have a strong influence 
on the way TMT members interact with each other (Barnard, 1968; Hitt, Ireland, & 
Hoskisson, 2003). While the importance of CEO characteristics on TMT interaction (i.e., 
conflict) sounds almost self-evident, there are few studies investigating the nature of this 
relationship.  As an exception, Eisenhardt et al’s (1997a) case study on 12 TMTs of high-
technology firms found that there was a high level of cognitive conflict but a low level of 
affective conflict in the TMTs wherein the CEOs followed a fair procedure in making 
strategic decisions.  Similarly, Finkelstein & Hambrick (1996) proposed that TMTs 
which have a CEO who is able to effectively incorporate diverse and even opposing 
perspectives from team members experience higher levels of cognitive conflict but lower 
levels of affective conflict, compared to TMTs with a CEO who is unable to integrate 
different perspectives.  Inspired by and in line with these studies, my second research 
goal of this dissertation is to address how a TMT is able to establish a constructive 
conflict profile by focusing on the moderating role of an important aspect of CEO 
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leadership - the CEO’s ability to provide procedural fairness. Specifically, I will examine 
(1) the moderating effects of CEO procedural fairness on the relationships between 
informational diversity and power centralization, and TMT conflict, and (2) the 
moderating effects of CEO procedural fairness on the relationship between TMT 
cognitive conflict and TMT affective conflict.  
Finally, it is important to systematically examine the effects of TMT conflict on 
firm performance because of the following two reasons. First, while the outcomes of 
conflict have been widely addressed in the teams literature, comprehensive examinations 
of the consequences of TMT conflict are rare. For instance, Eisenhardt et al.’s (1997b) 
study only focused on the effects of cognitive conflict on firm financial performance. 
Knight et al. (1999) simply examined the relationship between affective conflict and 
TMT strategic consensus.  More importantly, because of the covariance of cognitive 
conflict and affective conflict and the potential confounding effects of affective conflict 
on the consequences of cognitive conflict (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003), an examination 
of any single type of conflict of these two without having the other one put into the 
equation will very likely bias the results. Therefore, the third research goal of this 
dissertation is to investigate the relationship between both types of TMT conflict and firm 
performance. The third research question is this: How does TMT conflict affect firm 
performance?    
This study makes four contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to 
conflict research by advancing the examination of conflict antecedents into the context of 
TMTs. Specifically, I examine the effects of TMT informational diversity and power 
centralization on TMT conflict. In so doing, the goal is to provide a more complete 
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understanding of conflict in TMTs. Second, this study contributes to the conflict 
management literature by offering a solution to establishing a constructive TMT conflict 
profile. I address this question by investigating the moderating effects of CEO procedural 
fairness on the relationships between TMT informational diversity, power centralization 
and conflict, and on the cognitive conflict-affective conflict association as well. Third, 
this study contributes to the TMT conflict literature. It is the first study, to my 
knowledge, to systematically examine the effects of both TMT cognitive conflict and 
TMT affective conflict on firm performance. Finally, this study makes a contribution to 
the broader TMT literature. While a CEO usually plays a much more important role than 
other top executives in making strategic decisions (Finkelstein, 1992), most TMT 
research tends to equalize the CEO’s influences with those of other members (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1996; Pitcher & Smith, 2001). This simplifies the work of measurement; 
however, it may account for the mixed results in the TMT literature regarding the effects 
of TMT diversity on process variables and firm outcomes (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996; Pitcher & Smith, 2001; Smith et al., 1994). In this study, I highlight the function of 
CEO procedural fairness by examining the effects of its interaction with TMT diversity 
on TMT conflict and its unique role in decoupling TMT cognitive conflict from TMT 
affective conflict. 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. I next conduct a comprehensive review of 
the conflict research that has addressed such topics as the consequences of conflict, the 
antecedents to conflict, conflict coupling, and CEO procedural fairness, and develop a 
research model to answer the three research questions raised above, following which I 
propose 9 hypotheses to test the model. Next, I conduct two studies to test these 
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hypotheses: a game simulation with 77 project teams with business-major senior 
undergraduates and a field study with 61 TMTs of high-technology firms. These two 
studies complement each other to enhance both the internal validity and the 
generalizability of this dissertation. Finally, I discuss this research’s contributions to the 







CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a comprehensive review of the conflict 
literature. While the dissertation is focused on the context of TMTs, this review will 
review the conflict research in both the TMT literature and the broad teams literature. In 
the following discussion, I will first define the construct of conflict, followed with a 
review of the consequences of team conflict, the antecedents to team conflict, the 
association between cognitive conflict and affective conflict, and CEO procedural 
fairness, consecutively. As a conclusion of the literature review, at the end of this chapter, 
I will propose a research model to be examined empirically in this dissertation. 
 
What is Conflict?  
Conflict is an awareness of the parties involved of discrepancies, incompatible 
wishes, or irreconcilable desires (Boulding, 1963; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). It is ubiquitous 
across teams with a high level of task interdependence (Jehn, 1995). Past research has 
observed that conflict emerges when team members have developed opposing values and 
goals (Cosier & Rose, 1977; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Recent studies have 
further found that conflict may still dominate the team decision making process even 
when team members share the same goals because people with different knowledge bases 
and experiences may approach the team’s tasks from diverse and even opposing 
perspectives (Amason, 1996; Jehn et al., 1999).  
The observed effects of conflict are not uniform. On the one hand, much of the 
previous literature on conflict has generally viewed conflict as detrimental to team and 
firm performance  because it hurts team cohesiveness, slows the decision making process, 
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and undermines job satisfaction (e.g., Gladstein, 1984; March & Simon, 1958). On the 
other hand, recent studies have claimed conflict to be a beneficial phenomenon for team 
and firm outcomes in that it may improve understanding of information, uncover flawed 
assumptions, and enhance decision quality (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1997). Therefore, 
conflict is a double-edged sword, with both beneficial and detrimental effects (Amason & 
Schweiger, 1994).  
Recent research has attributed such double-edged effects to the multidimensional 
nature of conflict (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1994; 1995). The cognitive dimension of conflict 
(e.g., Amason, 1996), also labeled as task conflict (Eisenhardt et al., 1997b; Simons & 
Peterson, 2000), issue conflict (Hammer & Organ, 1978), or substantive conflict 
(Guetzkow & Gyr, 1954; Rahim, 2001), is a perception of disagreements among team 
members regarding the content of their decisions and involves differences in viewpoints, 
ideas, and opinions (Simons & Peterson, 2000). The affective dimension of conflict 
(Guetzkow & Gyr, 1954; Amason, 1996), also labeled as relationship conflict (Simons & 
Peterson, 2000), emotional conflict (Pelled et al, 1999), or interpersonal conflict 
(Eisenhardt et al, 1997a), however, is a perception of interpersonal clashes and typically 
includes anger, frustration, tension, annoyance, and animosity among team members 
(Simons & Peterson, 2000). Cognitive conflict is task-related and arises from differences 
in judgment or perspectives among team members; affective conflict, however, is 






                                                
Consequences of Conflict 
Empirical research has shown a generally positive relationship between cognitive 
conflict and team and firm performance (See Table 1 for a literature summary1). A 
relatively high level of cognitive conflict is able to enhance decision making quality, and, 
therefore, team and firm outcomes, by stimulating different perspectives on and 
promoting critical examinations of the decision making criteria (Amason, 1996; Bantel & 
Jackson, 1989). For instance, based on a study of 48 TMTs of food processing firms, 
Amason (1996) found that cognitive conflict was positively related to TMT decision 
quality. Dooley and Fryxell (1999) observed a positive relationship between cognitive 
conflict and TMT decision quality as well in a study of the TMTs of 86 hospitals.  
Eisenhardt et al.’s (1997b) qualitative study of the TMTs of 12 high-technology firms 
found that cognitive conflict positively predicted firm performance. With a study of 92 
work teams in the household goods moving industry, Jehn et al. (1999) revealed that 
cognitive conflict was positively associated with team performance. Similarly, Pelled et 
al. (1999) observed a positive relationship between cognitive conflict and team 
performance with the data of 45 work teams from a high-technology company. In 
addition, a moderate level of cognitive conflict may enhance team attitudinal outcomes 
such as affective acceptance (Amason, 1996) and decision commitment (Dooley & 
Fryxell, 1999). Through cognitive conflict, each member has the opportunity to exercise 
voice over task decisions, which increases the perceived fairness that team members have 
 
1 This review is focused on the research in the last 12 years, from 1995 -2006, published in major academic 
outlets including Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, California Management Review, Harvard Business Review, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Journal of Management, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Organization Science, Personnel 
Psychology, and the International Journal of Conflict Management. This rule is applied to the literature 
summary in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. 
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over how they view the decision making process (Amason, 1996; Korsgaard, Schweiger, 
& Sapienza, 1995).  
However, when the level of cognitive conflict becomes extremely high, it may 
begin to impair team and firm outcomes (see De Dreu & Weingart, 2003, for a review). 
For instance, with a study of 80 project teams of undergraduates in business programs, 
Porter and Lilly (1996) observed that team performance declined when the team 
experienced a very high level of cognitive conflict. Jehn’s (1995) study of 105 work 
teams dealing with nonroutine tasks found that cognitive conflict was curvilinearly (as in 
an inverted U ) related to team performance. In other words, when cognitive conflict goes 
beyond a certain level, it becomes detrimental.  Two plausible reasons account for this 
phenomenon. First, information processing research suggests that the amount of 
disagreement and variety in a team needs to match the level of variety of the task for the 
team to be effective (Tushman & Nadler, 1978). When the level of variety of different 
viewpoints in a team exceeds the level of task variety and the amount of information 
required to complete the task, the high cost of integrating diverse perspectives and 
evaluating solutions will lead to declines in team performance. More importantly, a very 
high level of cognitive conflict may hurt team members’ affective acceptance of and 
commitment to decisions (Amason, 1996; Jehn et al., 1997; Jehn et al., 1999), and 
therefore negatively affect team performance (Jehn, 1995; Simons & Peterson, 2000). 
This is because highly critical evaluations of others’ opinions can cause negative 
affective reactions such as tension, antagonism, and unhappiness, which distract attention 




Table 1: Consequences of Conflict 
 
Studies Data Findings 
Amason (1996) TMTs of 48 food processing firms 
Cognitive conflict (+) TMT decision quality; 
Cognitive conflict (+) understanding of decisions; 
Cognitive conflict (+) affective acceptance; 
Affective conflict (-) affective acceptance 
Dooley & Fryxell 
(1999) TMTs of 86 hospitals 
Cognitive conflict (+) decision quality and decision 
commitment;  
Cognitive conflict X team loyalty (+) decision quality;  
Cognitive conflict X team competence (+) team 
commitment 
Janssen, Van De 
Vliert, & Veenstra 
(1999) 
102 members of management 
teams (retrospection) 
Cognitive conflict X affective conflict X positive 
interdependence (+) team decision making effectiveness 
Jehn (1995) 
105 work teams and 
management teams in a 
freight transportation firm 
Cognitive conflict (-) satisfaction and the intent to 
remain;  
Cognitive conflict (reverted U) team performance;  
Affective conflict (-) satisfaction, liking, and the intent to 
remain;  
Affective conflict (n.s.) team performance;  
Cognitive conflict X task type (-) team performance.    
Jehn (1997) work teams in 6 organizations (qualitative study) 
Cognitive conflict X conflict dimensions (+) team 
performance;  
Affective conflict (-) team performance 
Affective conflict (-) satisfaction 
Jehn, Chadwick & 
Thatcher (1997) 
88 MBA teams at two 
business school (quasi-
experimental field study) 
Cognitive conflict (n.s.) team performance;  
Cognitive conflict (-) team satisfaction;  
Affective conflict (-) team performance 
Affective conflict (-) satisfaction 
Jehn, Northcraft, & 
Neale (1999) 
92 work teams in the 
household goods moving 
industry 
Cognitive conflict (+) team performance;  
Affective conflict (-) worker morale 
Knight et al. (1999) TMTs of 76 high-tech firms Affective conflict (-) strategic consensus 
Lovelace, Shapiro, 
& Weignart (2001) 
43 cross-functional work team 
in 16 high-tech firms 
Cognitive conflict X collaborative communications (+) 
team innovativeness 
Pelled (1996b) 
42 work teams from 2 
electronics manufacturing 
facilities 
Affective conflict (-) team productivity 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, 
& Xin (1999) 
45 work teams from the 
electronics divisions of 3 
corporations 
Cognitive conflict (+) team performance; 
Affective conflict (n.s.) team performance 
Porter & Lilly 
(1996) 
80 project teams of 
undergraduate students in 
business program 
Cognitive conflict (-) team performance 
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Most recent conflict research, inspired by Jehn’s (1995) work, has proposed a 
contingency view as a way to approach the influences of cognitive conflict on outcome 
variables (e.g., Alper, Tjosvold, & Law, 2000; Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). For instance, 
with 61 self-managing teams, Alper et al. (2000) argued that cognitive conflict was 
positively associated with team performance when team members perceived cooperative 
rather than competitive goal interdependence. In the same study mentioned earlier, 
Dooley and Fryxell’s (1999) found that when the level of team loyalty was high, 
cognitive conflict was more likely to enhance strategic decision quality, and that when 
the team competence was high, cognitive conflict was more likely to lead to a high level 
of team commitment to strategy implementation. Basing their study on 43 cross-
functional work teams in 16 high-technology firms, Lovelace et al. (2001) observed that 
in a team where collaborative communications were applied, cognitive conflict enhanced 
team innovativeness. Finally, De Dreu and Weingart’s (2003) meta-analysis of conflict 
research from 1994 to 2001 found that affective conflict confounded the effects of 
cognitive conflict on team outcomes. Cognitive conflict is likely to negatively affect team 
performance, when a high correlation between cognitive conflict and affective conflict 
was present than otherwise. 
Unlike cognitive conflict, affective conflict has been found consistently to impair 
team and firm performance across studies. For instance, in the same study mentioned 
earlier, Jehn (1995) found that affective conflict negatively affected team performance. 
With 42 work teams from 2 electronics manufacturing facilities, Pelled (1996b) found a 
negative relationship between affective conflict and team productivity. Finally, Knight et 
al. (1999) observed detrimental effects of TMT affective conflict on strategic consensus. 
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There are at least two ways through which affective conflict plays a dysfunctional role in 
influencing team and firm performance (Janssen, Van de Vliert, & Veenstra, 1999). First, 
affective conflict slows down the decision making process. It limits team cohesiveness, 
distracts team members’ attention away from the cognitive processing of information 
toward interpersonal issues, and consumes time and energy needed for working on the 
substantive team tasks (Jehn, 1995). Moreover, affective conflict reduces the quality of 
task decisions. Affective conflict disturbs effective communication and cooperation 
among team members. The negative reactions associated with affective conflict reduce 
team members’ receptiveness to ideas advocated by others who are disliked, decrease 
willingness to tolerate opposition, and give rise to hostile attribution concerning others’ 
intentions (Janssen et al., 1999).  
Affective conflict has a detrimental effect on team attitudinal outcomes as well, 
because the negative reactions associated with affective conflict, such as tension, 
annoyance, and animosity, inhibit team members’ ability to enjoy their work in teams 
(Amason, 1996; Simons & Peterson, 2000). For instance, Amason (1996) found that 
affective conflict was negatively related to the acceptance of decisions among TMT 
members. Jehn (1995) observed that affective conflict was negatively associated with 
team members’ satisfaction, their liking of other members, and their intent to stay in the 
team. This finding was further confirmed by Jehn’s (1997) and Jehn et al.’s (1997) 
studies.  Finally, Jehn et al.’s (1999) research revealed a negative relationship between 
affective conflict and work morale.  
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Antecedents to Conflict 
 Driven by the powerful effects of conflict on team and firm outcomes, research 
has also examined the antecedents to team conflict. For instance, Amason and Sapienza 
(1997) argued that team size positively affected both types of conflict because large 
teams had greater potential for dissimilarity. Amason and Mooney (1999) suggested that 
a high level of firm past performance lowered a TMT’s affective conflict because the 
organizational slack produced in the past reduced the tendency toward suspicion and 
mistrust among top managers. Knight et al. (1999) observed that functional diversity 
advanced affective conflict. More comprehensive studies on the antecedents to conflict 




Table 2: Antecedents to Conflict 
 
Studies Data Findings 
Amason & Mooney (1999) TMTs of 44 mid-sized public firms 
Past firm performance (n.s.) cognitive conflict; 
Past firm performance (-) affective conflict 
Amason & Sapienza (1997) TMTs of 48 food processing firms 
Team size (+) cognitive conflict;  
Openness (+) cognitive conflict;  
Team size (+) affective conflict;  
Openness X mutuality (-) affective conflict 
Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & 
Bourgeois (1997) 
TMTs of 12 high-tech firms 
(qualitative study) 
Age diversity (+) cognitive conflict; 
Educational diversity (+) cognitive conflict; 
Functional background diversity (+) cognitive 
conflict 
Jehn & Mannix (2001) 
51 MBA teams at 3 business 
schools (Quasi-experimental 
field study) 
value consensus (+) cognitive conflict 
Value consensus (-) affective conflict 
Jehn, Chadwick & Thatcher 
(1997) 
88 MBA teams at two business 
school (quasi-experimental field 
study) 
Education (+) cognitive conflict;  
Value diversity (-) cognitive conflict; 
Sex diversity (+) affective conflict;  
Value diversity (+) affective conflict 
Age & nationality (n.s.) cognitive and affective 
conflict;  
Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale 
(1999) 
92 work teams in the household 
goods moving industry 
Functional background diversity (+) cognitive 
conflict 
Educational diversity (+) cognitive conflict;  
Sex diversity (+) affective conflict; 
Age diversity (+) affective conflict;  
Value diversity (+) cognitive conflict; 
Value diversity (+) affective conflict 
Knight et al. (1999) TMTs of 76 high-tech firms Functional diversity (+) affective conflict 
Lovelace, Shapiro, & 
Weignart (2001) 
43 cross-functional work team in 
16 high-tech firms Functional diversity (+) cognitive conflict 
Pelled (1996b) 
42 work teams from 2 
electronics manufacturing 
facilities 
Gender diversity (+) affective conflict;  
Tenure diversity (+) affective conflict;  
Race diversity (n.s.) affective conflict;  
Team size (+) affective conflict 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin 
(1999) 
45 work teams from the 
electronics divisions of 3 
corporations 
Age diversity (-) cognitive conflict;  
Functional background diversity (+) cognitive 
conflict;  
Race diversity (+) affective conflict;  
Age diversity (-) affective conflict;  
Company tenure diversity (+) affective conflict 
Porter & Lilly (1996) 
80 project teams of 
undergraduate students in 
business program 
Trust (-) cognitive conflict 
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Team diversity refers to the dissimilarity among members in knowledge, 
perspectives, personality, or values (Priem et al., 1999). In terms of the difference of the 
nature of the diversity variables and the underlying mechanisms through which diversity 
variables impose their effects on conflict, Jehn et al. (1999) identified three categories of 
diversity: informational diversity, social categorical diversity (i.e., age, gender, and race 
diversity), and value diversity. In addition to these, Priem et al. (1999) and Pitcher and 
Smith (2001) suggested that the nature of power distribution within a team, specifically, 
power centralization was another important variable, particularly for TMTs, that may 
strongly affect team conflict as well. Since this dissertation is focused on informational 
diversity and power centralization, in the following I primarily review the studies of these 
two variables. 
 Informational diversity.  Informational diversity refers to the diverse knowledge 
bases and experiences of team members that they draw upon in making decisions. 
Constrained by the difficulty of directly collecting and measuring the data of team 
knowledge and experiences, such demographic variables as team tenure diversity, 
functional background diversity and educational diversity have been adopted as the proxy 
of informational diversity, because they have been widely recognized as a reflection of 
team knowledge stocks and experiences (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Jehn et al., 1999).  
Informational diversity has a strong effect on cognitive conflict. For instance, Jehn et al. 
(1999) found that functional background diversity and educational diversity were 
positively related to cognitive conflict. Pelled et al. (1999) observed a positive association 
between functional background diversity and cognitive conflict. This finding was further 
confirmed in Lovelace et al.’s (2001) study. The effects of informational diversity on 
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affective conflict were also observed. For instance, Knight et al. (1999) reported a 
positive relationship between functional diversity and affective conflict. Additionally, 
Pelled (1996b) observed that tenure diversity positively influenced affective conflict.   
  Power centralization. Power centralization refers to the extent to which the 
levels of influences over strategic decisions within a TMT are centered on the CEO or a 
few “core executives” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) instead of evenly distributed 
among all the TMT members (Bunderson, 2002; Finkelstein, 1992). The more 
disproportionably the power is consolidated on the CEO or a few “core executives”, the 
higher the level of power centralization. Power is an integral part of research on teams, 
particularly on TMTs (Finkelstein, 1992). As Finkelstein (1992: 505) argued: “[I]n 
organizations in which power is less polarized, consideration of a coalition of top 
managers is necessary to fully capture the range of managerial orientations prevailing. 
Hence, consideration of the distribution of power among top managers is an essential 
ingredient for research on TMTs.”  Furthermore, Pitcher and Smith (2001) argued that 
the exclusive concentration on demographic diversity variables in extant TMT research 
inhibited our understandings of how TMT characteristics affect the strategic decision 
making process, and that power distribution as a missing variable deserved closer 
research attention. In fact, they found that power distribution significantly affected the 
cooperation and interaction among top executives. Finally, Priem et al. (1999) argued that 
it is theoretically important to examine those substantive distribution variables such as 
power heterogeneity that may challenge the established demographics-based theories. As 
they pointed out, “[p]ower heterogeneity, for example, would likely encourage 
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expression of multiple viewpoints, whereas power homogeneity, with control typically 
centered in the CEO, would discourage such expression” (Priem et al., 1999: 945).   
No empirical research in the conflict literature thus far, to my knowledge, has 
explicitly examined the effects of TMT power centralization on TMT conflict. However, 
studies of corporate governance and executive politics may have shed insights on such a 
relationship. For instance, in an interdepartmental setting, Hayward and Boeker (1998) 
found that political interference between the equity research departments and the 
corporate finance departments in the same banks was unlikely to emerge, when the 
corporate finance department was significantly more powerful than the other one. 
Whereas, when the power was more evenly distributed between those two departments, 
the political contests in between were more likely to surface.  With a study of 120 U.S. 
industrial corporations, Ocasio (1994) observed that when the CEO’s power and 
influence was lessened as a result of firm performance decline or the CEO’s technical 
obsolescence, in other words, the power distribution became more decentralized, the 
latent political contests among top executives were more likely to come to the 
foreground. A similar finding was further found in Shen and Cannella’s (2002) study of 
387 public firms.  
 
Association between Cognitive Conflict and Affective Conflict 
Given their distinct patterns of emergence, mechanisms by which they relate to 
outcomes, and the generally opposite effects of cognitive conflict and affective conflict, it 
seems wise and straightforward that managers should simply encourage cognitive conflict 
and discourage affective conflict. However, empirical studies have reported that cognitive 
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conflict is generally highly positively related to affective conflict (See Table 3 for a 
review). In other words, these two types of conflict tend to be coupled and may not be 
easily separated (Amason, 1996; Jehn et al., 1999). Simons and Peterson (2000) 
summarized the literature and offered three plausible reasons for why these two types of 
conflict are highly correlated. First, cognitive conflict may lead to affective conflict 
through a mechanism of misattribution. Because of bounded rationality, some may 
construe others’ critiques of their opinions as personal attacks. Second, the harsh 
language associated with cognitive conflict may trigger interpersonal animosity and 
tension. As a result, affective conflict is induced. Finally, affective conflict may lead to 
cognitive conflict as well. Individuals who feel angry with other members of the team 
may have a propensity to dispute the ideas of those other members (Pelled et al., 1999). 
Underlying the above three reasons is the lack of mutual trust among team members 
(Simons & Peterson, 2000).  
 
Table 3: Conflict Correlation 
 
Studies Correlation 
Amason & Mooney (1999) 0.42 
Amason (1996)  0.39 
Amason & Sapienza (1997) 0.39 
Friedman, Tidd, Currall, & Tsai (1998) 0.84 
Janssen, Van de Vliert, & Veenstra (1999) 0.46 
Jehn & Mannix (2001) 0.55 
Jehn (1995) -0.17 
Jehn, Chadwick, & Thatcher (1997) 0.48 
Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale (1999) 0.55 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin (1999) 0.45 
Simons & Peterson (2000) 0.55 
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 Only two studies have looked into the question of establishing a constructive 
conflict profile for TMTs, namely, one with a relatively high level of cognitive conflict 
but a low level of or little affective conflict at the same time (Amason & Sapienza, 1997; 
Simons & Peterson, 2000). Amason and Sapienza (1997) argued that TMT openness was 
positively related to TMT cognitive conflict but negatively associated with TMT 
affective conflict. Although this view was supported by their empirical test with 48 
TMTs, Jehn’s (1995) study found that norms encouraging team open discussion actually 
increased the intensity of affective conflict. Basing their study on 70 TMTs of US-based 
hotels, Simons and Peterson (2000) argued that when a high level of intrateam trust was 
present in a TMT, cognitive conflict was less likely to lead to affective conflict. 
However, they did not explain how to further enhance cognitive conflict simultaneously 
when affective conflict was being diminished.  
 
A Solution to a Constructive Conflict Profile: The Role of CEO Procedural Fairness 
As the central members of TMTs (Jackson, 1992), CEOs are responsible for not 
only creating a long-term strategic vision to guide the behaviors of other top executives, 
but for facilitating the coordination and interaction among top managers as well 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). A successful CEO may take actions and/or create a 
favorable team norm to encourage team members’ information exchange and 
participation in making strategic decisions when it is necessary (Eisenhardt et al., 1997a). 
While it is almost self-evident that CEOs have an important impact on the processes and 
mechanisms through which conflict emerges, studies investigating the nature of this 
relationship are few. As an exception, Eisenhardt et al. (1997b) argued that in 
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demographically diverse TMTs, CEOs who adopted a fair decision making procedure 
were able to further enhance cognitive conflict, and at the same time, decrease affective 
conflict. Similarly, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) have suggested that a TMT with a 
CEO who is able effectively to incorporate diverse and even opposing perspectives 
associated with team diversity may experience a high level of cognitive conflict, but a 
low level of affective conflict. These studies have yielded significant insights regarding 
how CEO procedural fairness may help establish a constructive TMT conflict profile. 
CEO Procedural Fairness. CEO procedural fairness refers to the extent to which 
a CEO takes into account the concerns of all team members while making decisions 
(Cremer & Knippenberg, 2002). Procedural fairness strongly affects the behavioral 
interaction of team members. For instance, with three lab studies of business school 
students, Cremer and Knippenberg (2002) found that a leader’s procedural fairness 
enhanced team members’ cooperation and information exchange. With a field study of 88 
work teams, Colquitt, Noe, and Jackson (2002) observed that when team members were 
treated fairly, they were more likely to have functional disagreements over task decisions.  
Additionally, procedural fairness exerts a powerful influence on team members’ 
attitudinal interaction as well. Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, and Ng’s (2001) meta-
analysis of organizational justice found that procedural fairness positively affected the 
level of mutual trust and respect within a team. With a field study of a pharmaceutical 
corporation, Kernan and Hanges (2002) further found that procedural fairness was 
positively correlated with trust in management. The lack of fairness in the decision 
making process, however, may lead to negative affective results, such as mistrust, 
disregard, and even retaliation behaviors (Skarlicki, Folger & Tesluk, 1999). Since 
 
procedural fairness, as demonstrated above, exerts such a strong influence over the ways 
in which team diversity may relate to conflict, and creates a norm of mutual trust among 
members that may weaken the misattribution effects through which cognitive conflict 
leads to affective conflict, I expect that CEO procedural fairness is likely to moderate the 
relationship between TMT diversity and TMT conflict and the relationship between TMT 
cognitive conflict and TMT affective conflict. 
 
Research Model  
Based on the above literature review, I propose a model for TMT diversity, CEO 
procedural fairness and TMT conflict as shown in Figure 1. As indicated, TMT 
informational diversity and TMT power centralization are predicted to affect TMT 
conflict. CEO procedural fairness is predicted to moderate the relationships between 
conflict antecedent variables and TMT conflict, and to decouple TMT cognitive conflict 
from TMT affective conflict. Finally, this model predicts that both TMT cognitive 
conflict and affective conflict affect firm performance.  






























CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES 
Antecedents to Conflict 
 Informational diversity. As defined earlier, informational diversity refers to the 
diverse knowledge bases and experiences of team members that they draw upon in 
making decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Jehn et al., 1999). TMT cognitive conflict 
is defined as the perceived disagreements among TMT members regarding the content of 
their decisions, and involves differences in viewpoints, ideas and opinions (Amason, 
1996). TMT informational diversity is predicted to lead to TMT cognitive conflict. Top 
executives with different expertise and experiences are likely to propose very different 
and even conflicting viewpoints regarding the optimal strategic choices firms should 
pursue (Eisenhardt et al., 1997b). Also, because of the significant responsibility they 
possess, potent top managers are likely to stick to their own viewpoints, unless their 
concerns are well addressed by others who raise different opinions (Amason, 1996).  
Therefore, the higher the level of TMT informational diversity, the more likely TMT 
members perceive disagreements during the decision making process. I infer the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1. TMT informational diversity is positively related to TMT cognitive 
conflict. 
 
TMT informational diversity is unlikely to be related to TMT affective conflict. 
As I noted earlier, affective conflict refers to perceived interpersonal incompatibility and 
clashes characterized by anger, frustration and tension among team members (Amason, 
1996; Simons & Peterson, 2000). Affective conflict often occurs through a social 
 
 28
categorization mechanism (Tajfel, 1972). People tend to categorize others on the basis of 
salient demographic variables such as age, gender and race to make the external 
environments more predictable and controllable (Tajfel, 1972). Once categorization takes 
place, members strive to develop a positive social identity by showing favoritism to the 
members of their own social categories and resentment and discrimination toward those 
in other categories (Tajfel, 1972). The intrateam hostilities derived from social 
categorization effects, as a result, may surface as affective conflict (e.g., Jehn et al., 
1999). TMT informational diversity is job-oriented instead of socially related (Pelled, 
1996b), and therefore is unlikely to trigger the social categorization effects and lead to 
the emergence of affective conflict.  
 
 Power centralization. As defined earlier, power centralization refers to the extent 
to which the levels of influences over strategic decisions within a TMT are centered on 
the CEO or a few “core executives” (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) instead of evenly 
distributed among all the TMT members (Bunderson, 2002; Finkelstein, 1992). The more 
disproportionably the power is consolidated on the CEO or a few core executives, the 
higher the level of power centralization. Power centralization is predicted to be 
negatively related to TMT cognitive conflict. The lower the level of power centralization, 
the higher the likelihood that cognitive conflict may emerge. This is because a low level 
of power centralization, with power relatively evenly distributed among top executives, is 
able to ensure that each member has a real say in making decisions (Pfeffer, 1981). Also, 
relatively even power distribution may trigger political interference among top executives 
that is likely to surface as cognitive debate during the TMT decision making (Ocasio, 
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1984; Shen & Cannella, 2002). For instance, with a study of 120 U.S. industrial 
corporations, Ocasio (1994) observed that when the CEO’s power and influence became 
lessened as a result of declining firm performance or the CEO’s technical obsolescence - 
in other words, the level of power centralization became lower - the latent political 
contests among top executives were more likely to come to the foreground. Similar 
observation was revealed in Shen and Cannella’s (2002) study of the top executives of 
387 public firms. In contrast, when a high level of power centralization is present, those 
top executives who have significantly less power than others are likely to be discouraged 
from expressing their perspectives (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). As a result, cognitive 
conflict is unlikely to appear. This is because their opinions, even expressed, will not be 
given as much weight as those who are more influential and powerful (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996). Additionally, their distinct opinions, if perceived as threats by those 
powerful members (i.e., the CEOs), will put them into more disadvantageous situations 
(Daily & Dalton, 1994).  
  Power centralization is predicted to be negatively related to affective conflict as 
well. Intense competition among top executives for privileged status, which is associated 
with a high level of power decentralization, is likely to lead to anxiety, stress and tensions 
among TMT members (Casio, 1994; Wei & Cannella, 2002). In contrast, when the power 
is unequally concentrated with one or a few core members - in other words, when the 
level of power centralization is high - others may tend to avoid challenging the core 
members, and the relationship clashes among team members, if there are any, are also 
less likely to surface (Henderson & Fredrickson, 2001).  
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Hypothesis 2a. TMT power centralization is negatively related to TMT cognitive 
conflict. 
Hypothesis 2b. TMT power centralization is negatively related to TMT affective 
conflict. 
  
CEO Procedural Fairness as a Moderator 
Moderating effects on main relationships. As defined earlier, CEO procedural 
fairness refers to the extent to which a CEO takes into account the concerns of all team 
members while making decisions (Cremer & Knippenberg, 2002). CEO procedural 
fairness is predicted to enhance the positive relationship between informational diversity 
and cognitive conflict. A high level of CEO procedural fairness is able to foster mutual 
trust and respect among top managers and advance their commitment to their jobs, which 
in turn encourages team members to actively fulfill their role requirements - participation 
in decision making (Colquitt et al., 2002). Therefore, when a high level of CEO 
procedural fairness is present, members in a TMT with diverse knowledge bases and 
experiences are more likely to voice opinions from their own unique perspectives in order 
to fulfill their responsibility of making strategic decisions (Colquitt et al., 2002). As a 
result, the effects of TMT informational diversity on cognitive conflict will be further 
enhanced.  However, when CEO procedural fairness is low, TMT members are likely to 
perceive distrust, disregard, and even threats from the CEO and other core members. In 
such a situation, top managers would rather not raise their own unique perspectives 
derived from their informational backgrounds, because of the fear of what might be 
misunderstood to be personal attacks by the CEO and other powerful members 
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(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Consequently, even a TMT with a high level of 
informational diversity may experience a very low level of or little cognitive conflict. 
Therefore, I infer the following: 
Hypothesis 3. CEO procedural fairness enhances the positive effects of TMT 
informational diversity on TMT cognitive conflict.  
  
 CEO procedural fairness is predicted to negatively moderate the effects of power 
centralization on cognitive conflict, because it is able to encourage those top managers 
with a lower level of power to get involved in decision debates as actively as those with a 
higher level of power (Colquitt et al., 2001; Tyler & Lind, 1992). As I have argued 
above, in a TMT with a high level of power centralization, cognitive conflict is less likely 
to appear (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  This is because those top managers with a 
relatively lower level of power feel reluctant to voice their distinct opinions since their 
viewpoints, even when raised, will not be given as much weight as those who are more 
influential and powerful (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Additionally, their distinct 
opinions, if perceived as threats by others (i.e., the CEO), will consign them to more 
disadvantageous situations (Daily & Dalton, 1994). However, when a high level of CEO 
procedural fairness is present, the opinions of the members with a lower level of power 
are also likely to be taken by the CEO into appropriate consideration for strategy 
formulation. In addition, the norm of trust and mutual respect among top managers 
associated with a high level of CEO procedural fairness will diminish the misattribution 
effects during decision debates, which in turn encourages those TMT members with a 
lower level of power to raise their viewpoints (Colquitt et al., 2001; Kernan & Hanges, 
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2002).  As a result, team members are more likely to get involved in task-related 
discussion. Since a TMT with a high level of power centralization is likely to experience 
more cognitive conflict when a high level of CEO procedural fairness is available than 
otherwise, I infer the following: 
Hypothesis 4a.  CEO procedural fairness weakens the negative effects of power 
centralization on TMT cognitive conflict. 
  
 CEO procedural fairness may further strengthen the negative effects of power 
centralization on affective conflict. As predicted, power centralization is negatively 
related to affective conflict, because the latter is less likely to surface when there is little 
competition for privileged status among top executives that is associated with a high level 
of power centralization. In a TMT wherein a high level of CEO procedural fairness is 
present, power centralization is likely to be more negatively associated with affective 
conflict, because the trust norm derived from CEO procedural fairness further diminishes 
the possibility of political interference among top executives (Colquitt et al., 2002; Tyler 
& Lind, 1992). 
Hypothesis 4b. CEO procedural fairness enhances the negative effects of power 
centralization on TMT affective conflict. 
 
Moderating effects on the cognitive conflict-affective conflict relationship.  As 
noted before, cognitive conflict and affective conflict are highly coupled primarily 
because of misattribution effects. For example, some may attribute others’ critique of 
their opinions, or the harsh language associated with the critique, as personal attacks. As 
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a result, task-related debates lead to the emergence of affective conflict. Affective 
conflict may contribute to the development of cognitive conflict as well. Individuals who 
dislike some members of the team may have a greater propensity to openly dispute the 
ideas of those other members (Pelled et al., 1999).  CEO procedural fairness is able to 
decouple these two types of conflict through the following two mechanisms. First, 
procedural fairness facilitates cooperation and opinion exchange among team members 
(Cremer & Knippenberg, 2002), which enhances mutual trust and understanding, and, 
therefore, may prevent misattribution effects. Additionally, procedural fairness has a 
beneficial effect on team members’ attitudinal interaction (Tyler & Lind, 1992). With a 
fair procedure available, members and their opinions are more likely to be treated by 
others with respect and courtesy. As a result, cognitive conflict is less likely to lead to 
affective conflict.  Therefore, I infer the following: 
Hypothesis 5. When the level of CEO procedural fairness is higher, TMT 
cognitive conflict is less likely to be associated with TMT affective conflict.  
 
The Relationship between TMT Conflict and Firm Performance 
TMT cognitive conflict is predicted to have a curvilinear (inverted-U shape) 
relationship with firm performance. A relatively high level of cognitive conflict among 
top managers is able to enhance decision making quality and therefore firm outcomes by 
stimulating different perspectives and promoting critical examination of the decision 
making criteria (Amason, 1996; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Dooley & Fryxell, 1999). 
However, when cognitive conflict goes toward an extreme end, firm performance may 
start to decline because of at least two plausible reasons. First, an extremely high level of 
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variety of information inputs going into the TMT decision making process challenges top 
managers’ capability to interpret, digest, and finally integrate them into a well-accepted 
decision in a timely manner (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). 
This will hurt firm performance particularly for the firms in high-technology industries 
wherein a rapid response to environmental changes is indispensable for firm survival 
(Eishenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). More importantly, an extremely high level of cognitive 
conflict may impair TMT members’ affective acceptance of strategic decisions, and 
therefore the effectiveness of strategic implementation (Amason, 1996; Jehn et al., 1997; 
Jehn et al., 1999). Eventually, firm performance declines. I infer the following: 
Hypothesis 6a. TMT cognitive conflict has a curvilinear (inverted-U shape) 
relationship with firm performance.    
  
 Consistent with the literature, affective conflict is predicted to be negatively 
related to firm performance. Because affective conflict disturbs effective information 
exchange among top managers, it therefore slows down the TMT decision making 
process, reduces the quality of decisions, and limits the affective acceptance of strategic 
decisions and the effectiveness of strategic implementation (Amason, 1996; Amason & 
Shweiger, 1997). Therefore, I infer the following: 




CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODS 
Overview 
Two studies were conducted to test the stated hypotheses: an experimental study 
of 77 project teams with senior business-major undergraduates at a US-based university, 
and an in-depth field study of 61 TMTs of US-based high-technology firms. I conducted 
these two studies to enhance the validity of my research.  Specifically, internal validity of 
an experimental design was achieved in the lab study and external validity is improved 
with a field study.  It has been suggested that research profits from the use of a number of 
research methodologies, each of which may compensate for the weakness of the others 
(Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Schwenk, 1984). In this case, the experimental study of 
student-project teams permitted a degree of control of the causal variables that maximize 
internal validity to an extent that was difficult to achieve in “noisy” real world contexts 
(Brewer, 2000). The study of high-technology firms, however, provided the naturalism in 
field procedures, albeit at the potential cost of some internal validity. 
 
Study1: Experimental study - Game Simulation 
Game Introduction 
A computer-based simulation, the Cellular Industry Business Game (Audia et al., 
2000), was employed to conduct the experimental investigation of TMT conflict. This 
game simulated the evolution process of the cellular industry wherein Celcom 21 was 
running against 20 preprogrammed competitors in up to 5 regional markets in 
competition for market share. Participants played the roles of the top managers of Celcom 
21 to make strategic decisions to accomplish their company goal.  
 
 36
The game lasted 8 rounds, each simulating 1 year of competition. During each 
round of simulation, participants were required to make strategic decisions concerning 
the following 6 areas of activities: Raising Capital, Advertising, Sales Forces, R&D 
Investment, Buying Licenses, and Radio Wave Capacity. Within each area, participants 
were allowed to take various strategic actions. For example, in the sales forces area, they 
could (1) specify the number of employees as direct sales force as well as the number of 
dealers, (2) indicate the salary of the direct sales forces and the commission for the 
dealers as well, and (3) allocate both types of sales forces across markets. A complex set 
of formulas linking strategic actions to performance consequences are preprogrammed.  
Performance feedbacks were provided by the experimenter after each round of 
operation. In addition, at the end of each round of operation, participants could get access 
to five different types of information, including (1) general industry information from the 
Cellular industry association, (2) information concerning the industrial technologies and 
competitors, (3) information on customers, (4) information from industrial executives 
who are supportive of the TMT’s strategic decisions in the past, and (5) information from 
industrial executives who have questioned the TMT’s strategic decisions in the past.  
 
Design and Participants 
A total of 308 senior undergraduate students -150 males and 158 females- from a 
university located in the eastern coast of the United States who were taking a core 
strategic course-Strategic Management: Globalization and Competition were selected to 
participate in this study. Extra class credits for all participants and monetary reward for 
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game winners were offered to motivate students to participate in the game and to take it 
as seriously as in a real business world (see Appendix A for details). 
The strategic course was designed to educate graduating business students with 
the most recently-developed knowledge, theories and models in the field of strategic 
management and to help them well prepared for the management challenges in their 
forthcoming careers. Throughout the whole course, over 10 strategic decision making 
related real business cases were studied to improve students’ analytical skills and their 
understandings of strategic decision making. Since the lab study was conducted two 
weeks ahead of the conclusion of the entire semester, it was reasonable to expect that the 
participants had had a good understanding of the executive roles by the time point they 
participated in the game simulation.  
Students were grouped into four categories by their majors: General Management 
or International Management (70), Information Systems or Engineering (63), Finance or 
Accounting (95), and Marketing (80). I assigned them into 77 teams with four students in 
each by randomly picking one from each of the four categories. The students in each 
team played the role of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a Chief Technology Officer 
(CTO), a Chief Finance Officer (CFO), and a Chief Marketing Officer (CMO), 
respectively. I tried to match the participants’ majors with the roles they were to play. For 
example, a student with a general management or international management major was 
assigned as a CEO, and a student with finance or accounting major was assigned as a 
CFO. However, since the number of participants in the four categories was not equal to 
each other, I assigned finance or accounting-major participants to play the role of CEO, 
and finance, accounting, or marketing-major participants to play the role of CTO, after 
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the subjects in the general management or international management category and 
information systems or engineering category were used up. As a result, there were 14 
teams that had at least one role-major mismatch among the four members. An 
independent samples t-test for the equality of means was used to compare those 14 teams 
with the other 63 teams. The results showed no significant difference in terms of the level 
of conflict and market share.  
To prepare participants for their roles, before the game started, each member was 
given a one-page memo (see Appendix A) that described the background information of 
the Cellular industry, the strategic goal of Cellcom21 in the next 8 years, and the 
procedures that the participants needed to follow to play the game. The game coordinator 
explained the memo and demonstrated one round of game operation to the participants as 
well. Then, each team started to practice two rounds of game operation to get familiar 
with the designated areas of activities. After the game practice session was finished and 
right before the game formally started, participants were given another one-page 
instruction sheet that described the teamwork policy, recommended strategic actions, the 
decision making procedure, and the team power structure (see Appendix B). While the 
participants were told that the game was going to last 10 rounds, the experimenter 
interrupted it right after the 8th round was finished to prevent endgame effects. 
Participants completed a survey during the game process. The first part of the 
survey that asked about participants’ background information was filled out before the 
game started. The rest of the survey with scaled items for conflict measures and 





This study employed a 2×2×2 design with two levels of informational diversity 
(high informational diversity and low informational diversity), two levels of power 
centralization (high power centralization and low power centralization), and two levels of 
CEO procedural fairness (high fairness and low fairness).  
Informational Diversity 
For a high level of informational diversity, each of the four members in a team 
was provided with an alternative strategy on the instruction sheet that highlights his/her 
functional expertise. Each alternative strategy consisted of suggested strategic actions on 
three areas of activities among the following: raising capital, advertising, sales forces, 
R&D investment, buying licenses, and radio wave capacity (see Appendix B for 
alternative strategies). The instruction sheet also said that the suggested strategic actions 
had been proven effective, and therefore he/she should persuade his/her team to pursue 
those strategic actions, otherwise, the performance of his/her team might suffer.  
For a low level of informational diversity, the content of all the four alternative 
strategies was provided to all team members (see Appendix C). Other than that, the 
instructions were the same as those for a high level of information diversity.  
Power Centralization 
Two different scenarios indicating two different levels of power centralization 
were provided to all team members in a team on the one-page instruction sheet.  For a 
high level of power centralization, the scenario said, “The decision making power 









In terms of the decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power 
to finalize the strategic decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status 
and power, but all are also far below the CEO in decision making power.” 
For a low level of power centralization, the scenario was as follows: “The 












The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic decisions in your team. The next most 
powerful individual in the team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The 
CTO and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below the CFO in 
decision making power.”  
To further strengthen the power centralization manipulation, in addition to the 
scenarios, title cards with different sizes were used to highlight the level of power for 
each member and the specific role each member played. The cards sit right in front of 
each team member, visible to the entire team. The size of the cards varied according to 
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the actual level of power a team member had been assigned in the scenario. For example, 
in the case of a high level of power centralization, the title card for the CEO was the 
biggest among all in terms of size, the CFO’s was a little smaller than the CEO’s, and 
those for the other two members were a little smaller than the CFO’s, but equal to each 
other. In the case of a low level of power, the card for the CEO was significantly bigger 
than those for other members which were equal to each other. Finally, the size of the 
cards for the CEO, CTO, and CMO was the same cross teams with different power 
structures.     
CEO Procedural fairness  
To manipulate CEO procedural fairness, two different scenarios that described 
how one should fulfill the responsibility of the CEO in finalizing strategic decisions were 
described on the one-page instruction sheet and provided to the CEO players. For a high 
level of fairness, the scenario was as follows:  “As the CEO, you are responsible for 
finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT (top management team), individuals 
from different functional backgrounds may approach the same strategic issue with 
different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate limited financial resources to 
enhance a company’s financial performance, a Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) is more 
likely to highlight the importance of such marketing activities as advertising and would 
suggest investing more in marketing activities, while a Chief Technology Officer (CTO) 
may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore suggest more investment into the 
R&D area. While top executives’ opinions are likely to be different and even 
contradictory, the best decisions occur when everyone has a chance to express their 
position and the team works to integrate the various perspectives of different team 
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members. Therefore, you are strongly encouraged to (1) provide all team members equal 
opportunities for contributing to strategic decisions, (2) make sure that all team members’ 
concerns are given appropriate consideration, (3) provide all team members with equal 
opportunities to support, challenge and refute your viewpoints, (4) clarify decisions when 
requested by any team members, and (5) listen to every member’s concerns before 
making decisions.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating your performance 
as the CEO in doing these five things.”  
For a low level of fairness, the scenario said, “As the CEO, you are responsible 
for finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT (top management team), 
individuals from different functional backgrounds may approach the same strategic issue 
with different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate limited financial resources 
to increase a high-technology company’s financial performance, a Chief Marketing 
Officer (CMO) is more likely to highlight the importance of marketing activities as 
advertising and would suggest to invest more in marketing activities, but a Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO) may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore would 
suggest more investment in the R&D area.  Due to their specific backgrounds and limited 
access to other information, their opinions are likely to be biased.  Your job as the CEO is 
to make the best decision possible.  Therefore, as the CEO, when it comes to making 
strategic decisions, you may very well want just to follow your own judgment or rely on 
one or two team members more than the others.  You should NOT concern yourself with 
addressing all team members’ concerns, providing all team members with opportunities 
to support, challenge, and refute your viewpoints, clarifying decisions when requested by 
any team members, or even with listening to every member’s concerns before making 
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decisions.  Your responsibility is to make the best decisions possible and that is what you 
will be judged by.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating your performance 
as the CEO in making effective decisions and making this a higher priority than being 




As listed in Table 4, five-point Likert–type items ranging from 1, “strongly 
disagree”, to 5, “strongly agree”, were used to check the effectiveness of the 
manipulation. Five items were used to check the manipulation validity of informational 
diversity [α=0.80; ICC(1)=0.22; ICC(2)=0.53)]. One example item is, “Information that 
each member brings to the decision making process is very different.” Three items were 
used to check the manipulation validity of power centralization [α=0.75; ICC(1)=0.10; 
ICC(2)=0.32]. One example item is, “In our team, the CFO is a little less powerful than 
the CEO, but more powerful than the CTO and CMO.” As to CEO procedural fairness 
[α=0.90; ICC(1)=0.10; ICC(2)=0.31], six items were used, and one example item is, 
“Our CEO allows each team member to have a real say in how to make decisions over 
the six areas of activities.”  ANOVA analysis revealed that the manipulations for 
informational diversity [F(1, 76)=21.40**], power centralization [F(1, 76)=2.63*], and 
CEO procedural fairness [F(1, 76)=4.34*] were successful. Manipulation check data were 
provided by all team members through the surveys. 
  
 
   
 
 




1. Information that each member brings to the decision making process is very different 
2. Members tend to provide very different information even about the same area of activities   
3. Different members focus on different areas of activities instead of all, in making strategic decisions 
4. Members approach the decisions over the six areas of activities from different perspectives 
5. Different member brings different types of information to the discussion table 
Power Centralization 
1. Except the CEO, all the other members have a similarly low level of power in making decisions 
2. The CFO is a little less powerful than the CEO, but  more powerful than the CTO and CMO (reverse coded) 
3. Our CEO is significantly more powerful than all the other members 
CEO Procedural Fairness 
1. Our CEO allows each team member to have a real say in how to make decisions over the six areas of activities 
2. Our CEO provides all team members equal opportunities for contributing to the final  decisions 
3. Our CEO makes sure that all team members’ concerns are given appropriate consideration 
4. Our CEO clarifies decisions and provides additional information when requested by any team members 
5. Our CEO provides all team members with equal opportunities to support, challenge and refute his/her 
 viewpoints 
6.  Our CEO listens to every team member' concerns before making decisions 
 
Dependent variables  
Conflict. Consistent with the literature (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1995), conflict was 
measured by five-point Likert-type items ranging from 1, “strongly disagree”, to 5, 
“strongly agree”, respectively (see Table 5). I slightly revised the 6 items adopted from 
the conflict literature to match them with the game simulation context. Confirmatory 
factor analysis, as showed in Table 6, further identified three items for TMT cognitive 
conflict [α=0.84; ICC(1)=0.20; ICC(2)=0.50)], and another three for TMT affective 
conflict [α=0.80; ICC(1)=0.14; ICC(2)=0.39)].  Example items for cognitive conflict 
include, “In our team, there are often disagreements about the content of the decision the 




about the decisions the team is working on.” Example items for affective conflict are, “In 
our team, team members may get angry at each other,” and, “In our team, people tend to 
take the arguments in the team personally.” Conflict data were provided by all team 
members through the surveys. 
Table 5: Five-point Likert-type Items Used to Measure Conflict 
 
Cognitive Conflict 
1. In our team, there are often disagreements about what decisions to make regarding the same areas of activities 
2.  In our team, there are often disagreements about what areas of activities the team should concentrate on 
3. In our team, people often have conflicting opinions about the content of the decisions the  team is working on 
Affective Conflict 
1.  In our team, team members may get angry at each other 
2.  There is little emotional conflict between team members while making task decisions   (reverse coded) 
3. In our team, team members tend to take the arguments in the team personally 
 
 
Table 6: Factor Analysis of Conflict Variables  
Using Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation 
   
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Affective conflict 1   0.61862 
Affective conflict 2   0.69123 
Affective conflict 3   0.60678 
Cognitive conflict 1 0.85091   
Cognitive conflict 2 0.87908   
Cognitive conflict 3 0.82913   
 
Firm performance. Firm performance was measured by market share (%). The 
data concerning market share was provided by the game at the end of the simulation. 
Market share is the preprogrammed goal for the cellular business game. A complicated 
set of formula that relates the six areas of strategic activities with market share has been 
preprogrammed into the game (Audia et al., 2000). In addition, market share was highly 




Informational diversity. The experimental treatment for informational diversity as 
explained before consisted of two levels: one high, and another one, low. These two 
levels of informational diversity were coded as “1 = a low level of informational 
diversity”, and, “2 = a high level of informational diversity”.  
Power centralization. The experimental treatment for power centralization 
consisted of two levels: one high, and another one, low. These two levels of power 
centralization were coded as, “1 = a low level of power centralization”, and, “2 = a high 
level of power centralization”.  
Moderator 
CEO procedural fairness. The experimental treatment for CEO procedural 
fairness as explained before consisted of two levels: one high, and another one, low. 
These two levels of procedural fairness were coded as “1 = a low level of CEO 






Study 2: Field Study 
Sample and Research Procedures 
The target sample for the field study was TMTs in high-technology firms located 
in two geographic regions – the Baltimore-Washington, D.C. area, and the Philadelphia. 
This field study was conducted as part of a larger research funded by the National 
Science Foundation and involved four Ph.D. students and two faculty members at the 
University of Maryland and one faculty member at Stanford University. 
The sample firms were identified based on two criteria. First, because I was 
collecting data through structured interviews with CEOs, all firms had to be 
headquartered locally or within driving distance. Second, I was interested in TMT 
conflict in high-technology industries; therefore, I sampled on a set of high-technology 
firms. Following Milkovich (1987), I defined high-technology firms as companies that 
are in industries characterized by an emphasis on innovation, products with short life-
cycles, workforces comprised of a large percentage of scientists and engineers, and a 
need to re-invest a large percentage of revenues in R&D.   
A list of 358 high-technology companies meeting these two criteria was identified 
through Hoovers’ Online service. This online service provides company profiles, 
including such information as the core business of the firm, the names of top managers, 
and the contact address. Of these 358 firms, 32 companies were excluded because they 
had either been acquired or the CEO was not located in the geographical area.  
I followed a multi-step approach to obtain access to data from each organization. 
First, I sent a package to the CEO outlining the study and including an introduction letter 
to solicit participation (see Appendix D), and an endorsement letter from the Dean of the 
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R.H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland (See Appendix E).  Second, 
approximately one week after the package was sent out, I telephoned each CEO to 
schedule an on-site interview, during which I gained his/her support for the research, 
obtained a list of other members of the TMT, and collected data for firm performance, 
specifically, new product innovation (see Appendix F&G).  Finally, I distributed surveys 
to all of the TMT members, including the CEO.   
Out of 327 companies, 92 CEO agreed to be interviewed, a participation rate of 
28.1%. Only 61 companies out of 92 submitted at least 1 TMT survey along with the 
CEO survey, while all CEOs interviewed agreed to complete the survey.  The response 
rate was 66% and the average number of top managers completing the survey from these 
firms was 3.44, including the CEO. An independent samples t-test for the equality of 
means was used to compare the 61 completed companies and the 31 incomplete 
companies. The results showed no significant difference in terms of the number of 




The main purpose of the CEO interview was to obtain participation and collect 
firm performance data - new product innovation - in this study. The CEO interview was 
also important for identifying other TMT members, including the CEO, to survey. 92 




Both the CEO and other TMT members identified by the CEO were asked to 
complete a survey, which included background items, such as tenure, education 
background, and functional background (see Appendix H), to measure informational 
diversity and scaled items to measure conflict.  In addition, the TMT survey included the 
scaled items to capture CEO procedural fairness and TMT power centralization.  As 
mentioned earlier, out of 92 interviews that were performed, 61 firms (66%) participated 
in the study.  
 
Measures 
Dependent Variables  
Firm performance. Firm performance was measured by new product innovation. 
The data were provided by the CEOs during the structured interview. Consistent with the 
literature (e.g., Damanpour, 1991; Smith et al., 2005), I measured product innovation by 
counting the number of new products introduced by that particular firm in the most recent 
year (e.g., Damanpour, 1991; Smith et al., 2005). Construct validity for this measurement 
was further confirmed by a high correlation coefficient between the number of new 
product introductions and the number of scientists working in the R&D department 
(r=0.38, p<0.01)  
I used product innovation as the outcome variable for the field study based on the 
following two reasons. First, innovation is the natural outcome for high-technology firms 
(Damanbour, 1991). High-technology firms are embedded in industries characterized by 
an emphasis on innovation, products with short life-cycles, workforces comprised of a 
large percentage of scientists and engineers, and a need to re-invest a large percentage of 
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revenues in R&D (Milkovich, 1987). Continuous product innovation is the primary way 
for high-tech firms to maintain their competitive advantage and even survival (Waldman 
& Jensen, 2003).  
Second, a decision making process characterized by a large variety of opinions 
and conflicting viewpoints is likely to end up with creative ideas and decisions, which 
can be transferred into innovation. For instance, De Dreu and West’s (2001) study on a 
set of cross-functional teams revealed that team dissent was positively related to team 
innovation. Lovelace et al. (2001) also found that cognitive conflict was able to enhance 
the innovativeness for cross-functional new product teams. Considering the context 
differences between general work teams and TMTs as argued earlier, the relationship 
between TMT conflict and firm innovation deserves an empirical examination. 
Conflict. Like in the lab study, conflict was measured by five-point Likert-type 
items ranging from 1, “strongly disagree”, to 5, “strongly agree”, respectively. To 
enhance the scale reliability, seven instead of six items adopted from the literature were 
used to measure conflict in this field study (see Table 7). Confirmatory factor analysis, as 
showed in Table 8, further identified three items for cognitive conflict [α=0.82; 
ICC(1)=0.14; ICC(2)=0.40], and another four for affective conflict [α=0.67; 
ICC(1)=0.17; ICC(2)=0.46]. One example item for cognitive conflict is, “In our team, 
there are often disagreements about the content of the decision the team has to work 
through.” One example item for affective conflict is, “In our team, team members may 
get angry at each other.” Conflict data were provided by the CEO and TMT members 






Table 7: Five-point Likert-type Items Used to Measure Conflict 
 
Cognitive Conflict 
1.   There is often a lot of disagreement about the content of the decision the team has to work through 
2. There are often disagreements about the decisions involving the task the team is working on 
3. People often have conflicting opinions about the decisions the team is working on 
Affective Conflict 
1.   Members very often get angry at each other 
2. There is little emotional conflict between team members while making task decisions (reverse coded) 
3. People tend to take the arguments in the team personally 
4.  Arguments between team members are highly task-related, not personally motivated (reverse coded) 
 
 
Table 8: Factor Analysis of Conflict Variables 
Using Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation 
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Affective conflict 1  0.52099 
Affective conflict 2  0.67851 
Affective conflict 3  0.54685 
Affective conflict 4  0.82294 
cognitive conflict 1 0.80942  
cognitive conflict 2 0.81734  
cognitive conflict 3 0.83987  
 
Independent Variables 
TMT informational diversity. As defined earlier, informational diversity refers to 
the diverse knowledge base and experiences of team members that they draw upon in 
making decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Jehn et al., 1999). Tenure diversity, 
educational diversity, and functional background diversity are the three demographic 
variables that have been well recognized as information-relevant (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Smith et al., 1994), and have been used as the proxy to capture team 
informational diversity in the literature (Jehn et al., 1999). In line with the literature, I 
measured TMT informational diversity with the mean of the standardized scores of TMT 
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company tenure diversity, TMT educational diversity, and TMT functional background 
diversity. Below is the specific measure for those three variables.  
Tenure refers to the length of time a top manager has been in his/her current 
position (by year). A coefficient of tenure variation across TMT members in each team 
was used to measure TMT tenure diversity (Harrison & Klein, forthcoming; Smith et al., 
1994).  
Educational background was measured by the time length of post-high school 
education (by year). A coefficient of education variation across TMT members in each 
team was used to measure TMT educational diversity (Harrison & Klein, forthcoming; 
Smith et al., 1994).  
Each top manager’s dominant functional background is defined as the area in 
which the manager has the most experiences. Drawn on the literature (Michel & 
Hambrick, 1992), TMT members’ functional backgrounds were grouped into six main 
categories: general management, operations, R&D, marketing & sales, finance & 
accounting, and other.  TMT members were asked to identify the functional category that 
most closely represented their background in the survey. Functional diversity was 
measured in terms of Blau’s (1977) diversity index: (1 - Σi2), where “i” is the proportion 
of the group in the “i”th category. A higher score in this index indicates a greater level of 
TMT functional diversity. The data of informational diversity were provided by the CEO 
and other TMT members through the surveys. 
Power centralization. As noted, power centralization refers to the extent to which 
the levels of influences over strategic decisions within a TMT are centered on the CEO or 
a few core executives instead of evenly distributed among all the TMT members 
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(Finkelstein, 1992). Power is centralized, if some top executives are much more involved 
in strategic decision making process than others (Bunderson, 2002). Drawing upon the 
power literature (Bunderson, 2002; Finkelstein, 1992; Ocasio, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 
2002), I asked the top managers (excluding the CEO) in the survey to grade other 
members’ influences over strategic decision making (see Table 9 for the questionnaire). 
One specific member’s influence was measured by the mean of the scores given by all 
other members. A high score means a high level of influence that a specific member has 
over strategic decision making. The coefficient of influence variation across all TMT 
members within a team was used to measure power centralization. A high score means a 
high level of TMT power centralization.  
Table 9: Questionnaire for Power 
 
The following section asks about the influence of top management team members, including yourself, on your 
organization’s strategic decision-making. Please write down each member’s name, and circle the number 
indicating how much influence this person has into the decision making process for strategic decisions that affect 
this organization. 
1 = extremely weak influence 2 = weak influence 3 = moderate influence 4 = strong influence 5 = extremely 
strong influence 





Member’s name:  1       2       3       4       5 
Member’s name:  1       2       3       4       5 
Member’s name:  1       2       3       4       5 
Member’s name:  1       2       3       4       5 




 CEO procedural fairness.  Five five-point Likert –type items (see Table 10) 
ranging from 1, “strongly disagree”, to 5, “strongly agree”, were used to measure CEO 
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procedural fairness [α=0.90; ICC(1)=0.32; ICC(2)=0.53]. I adapted the items from those 
Cremer and Knippenberg (2002) employed to capture leader procedural fairness. 
Example items include, “Our CEO allows each team member to have a real say in how 
the team carries out its work,” and, “Our CEO provides equal opportunity for 
contributing to important decisions”  
 
Table 10: Five-point Likert-type Items Used to Measure CEO Procedural Fairness 
 
CEO Procedural Fairness 
1.  Our CEO allows each team member to have a real say in how the team carries out its work 
2. Our CEO makes sure that all team members’ concerns are given appropriate consideration 
3. Our CEO provides equal opportunity for contributing to important decisions 
4. Our CEO provides team members with opportunities to support, challenge and refute his/her viewpoints 
5. Our CEO listens to team members' concerns before making decisions 
 
Control Variables 
Team size, age diversity, and gender diversity have been observed as being related 
to team conflict (Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Jehn et al., 1999). Therefore, I controlled for 
these variables.  Team size was measured by the number of team members (including the 
CEO)  identified by the CEO during the interview as being involved in strategic decision 
making process (Collins & Clark, 2003). The coefficient of age variation across all team 
members in a TMT was used to measure age diversity. Gender diversity was measured in 
terms of Blau’s (1977) diversity index: (1 - Σi2), where “i” is the proportion of team 
members in the “i”th category. There are two categories: one male, and another one, 
female. A higher score in this index indicates a greater level of gender diversity. The data 
for the control variables were collected through the surveys. 
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R&D investment was also controlled when measuring the effects of conflict on 
firm product innovation, because as an important input to organizational innovation 





CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
Study 1: Experimental Study - Game Simulation 
Analytical Procedures 
Hierarchical regression and two-way ANOVA analysis were used to test the hypotheses. 
Results 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations of all the variables in this study 
were reported in Table 11.  A hierarchical multiple regression analysis in which conflict 
was the dependent variable was used to test Hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 2b.  As shown in 
Table 12 (β = 0.24, p<0.05), Hypothesis 1 that predicted that TMT informational 
diversity is positively related to TMT cognitive conflict was supported. Hypothesis 2a 
predicted that power centralization is negatively related to TMT cognitive conflict. Table 
12 (β = -0.20, p<0.10) showed partial support for this hypothesis. Hypothesis 2b 
predicted that power centralization is negatively related to TMT affective conflict. As 
indicated in Table 12, such a relationship is non-significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 2b 
was not supported.  
 
Table 11: Correlation Matrix 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Informational diversity 0.45 0.50      
2. Power centralization 0.49 0.50 -0.09     
3. CEO procedural fairness 0.51 0.50 0.07 0.11    
4. Cognitive conflict 11.85 2.34 0.27* -0.29* -0.09   
5. Affective conflict 5.29 1.17 0.08 -0.09 -0.50** 0.28*  
6. Market share 12.23 7.67 -0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.20+ -0.29* 
Note: N=77; + = P<0.1; * = P<0.05; ** = P<0.01 






Table 12:  Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for the Effects of Conflict Antecedents on 
Conflict 
Independent Variables Cognitive Conflict Affective Conflict 
Power centralization -0.20+ -0.08 
Informational diversity 0.24* 0.08 
R2 0.11* 0.01 
F 4.36* 0.49 
Note:+ = P<0.1; * = P<0.05; ** = P<0.01  
A two-way ANOVA was used to test Hypothesis 3, 4a and 4b.  Hypothesis 3 
predicted that CEO procedural fairness enhances the positive effects of TMT 
informational diversity on TMT cognitive conflict. The significant interaction effect [F 
(1, 73) = 7.93, p<0.01] and Figure 2 that portrayed such effect revealed support for 
Hypothesis 3. Specifically, TMT informational diversity was more likely to result in a 
higher level of cognitive conflict, when the level of CEO procedural fairness was high. In 
contrast, with a lower level of CEO procedural fairness, TMT informational diversity was 
less positively related to cognitive conflict. Hypothesis 4a predicated that CEO 
procedural fairness weakens the negative effects of power centralization on TMT 
cognitive conflict. This hypothesis was not supported, since two-way ANOVA analysis 
showed no significant interaction effects. Hypothesis 4b predicted that CEO procedural 
fairness enhances the negative effects of power centralization on TMT affective conflict. 
Since no significant direct effects of power centralization on affective conflict was found, 
Hypothesis 4b did not stand.  
To test Hypothesis 5, which predicted that when a high level of CEO procedural 
fairness is present, TMT cognitive conflict is less positively associated with TMT 
affective conflict, a hierarchical moderated multiple regression analysis was conducted. 
Model 2 of Table 13 (β = 0.28, p<0.05) indicated that cognitive conflict was positively 
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related to affective conflict. Furthermore, model 4 of Table 13 (β = -0.29, p<0.05) and 
Figure 3 both showed significant negative moderating effects of CEO procedural fairness 
on the conflict relationship, therefore supporting Hypothesis 5.  
 
Figure 2: The Moderating Effects of CEO Fairness on the Relationship between Informational Diversity 



























   
Figure 3: The Moderating Effects of CEO Fairness on the Relationship between Cognitive Conflict and 
































Table 13: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for the Relationship between Cognitive Conflict and Affective 
Conflict 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Step1: Control variables     
Power centralization -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Informational diversity 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.05 
R2 0.01    
F  0.49    
Step2: Main effects     
Cognitive Conflict  0.28* 0.22* 0.42** 
R2  0.08   
R2 change  0.07*   
F   2.10*   
F change  5.26*   
Step3: Moderator     
CEO procedural fairness   -0.48** -0.48** 
R2   0.31  
R2 change   0.27**  
F    7.96**  
F change   23.54**  
Step4: Interaction     
CEO fairness X Cognitive conflict    -0.29* 
R2    0.35 
R2 change    0.04* 
F     7.62** 
F change    4.69* 
Note:+ = P<0.1; * = P<0.05; ** = P<0.01   
 
Hypothesis 6a and 6b were tested with hierarchical multiple regression models. 
Hypothesis 6a predicted that TMT cognitive conflict is curvilinearly (inverted U shape) 
related to firm performance. As indicated in model 2 of Table 14, neither cognitive 
conflict nor cognitive conflict squared was significantly related to market share that was 
used to measure firm performance in this study. Therefore, Hypothesis 6a was not 
supported. Affective conflict (β = -0.25, p<0.05), however, was significantly negatively 





Table 14: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for the Effects of Conflict on  
Market Share 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Step 1: Control Variables   
Power centralization 0.06 0.03 
Informational diversity 0.02 -0.05 
R2 0.00  
F 0.14  
Step 2: Main Effects   
Cognitive conflict  -0.08 
Cognitive conflict Squared  -0.11 
Affective conflict  -0.25* 
R2  0.11 
R2 change  0.11+ 
F  3.52 
F change  2.60+ 
Note:+ = P<0.1; * = P<0.05; ** = P<0.01  
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Study 2: Field Study 
Analytical Procedures 
Hierarchical regression models were used to test all the hypotheses. 
Results 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations of all the variables in the field 
study were reported in Table 15.  I used hierarchical moderated multiple regression 
models in which conflict was the dependent variable to test Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 
4b.  As shown in Table 16 and Table 17, control variables including team size, age 
diversity, and gender diversity were entered in the first step.  Informational diversity and 
power centralization were entered in the second step to test their main effects on conflict.  
I entered the moderator variable, CEO procedural fairness, in the third step and the 
interaction terms in the fourth step to test the moderating hypotheses.   I then plotted each 
interaction to examine the form of the moderated relationships. 
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Table 15: Correlation Matrix 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. R&D investment          14.32 13.05  
2. Team size  3.44 1.15         
          
          
          
        
           
-0.06  
3. Age diversity 0.14 0.08 -0.29* 0.14  
4. Gender diversity 0.98 0.13 0.02 0.13 -0.11  
5. Power centralization 0.85 0.07 0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.15  
6. Informational diversity -0.08 1.71 -0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.08 -0.11  
7. CEO fairness 19.81 7.20 0.17 -0.08 0.13 0.09 0.24+ 0.1    
8. Cognitive conflict 8.79 1.71 0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.02 -0.37** 0.37** -0.22+   
9. Affective conflict 10.36 1.92 0.06 0.15 0.22+ -0.08 -0.32** 0.47** 0.04 0.68**  
10. Innovation (ln) 1.78 1.22 0.06 -0.03 0.19 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.06 -0.09 -0.16 
Note: N=61; + = P<0.1; * = P<0.05; ** = P<0.01  




Table 16: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for the Effects of Conflict Antecedents on Cognitive Conflict 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Step1: Control variables     
Team size 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.09 
Age diversity -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Gender diversity 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 
R2 0.00    
F 0.05    
Step2: Main effects     
Power centralization  -0.31** -0.26* -0.20 
Informational diversity  0.34** 0.36** 0.33* 
R2  0.23   
R2 change  0.23**   
F   3.23*   
F change  7.99**   
Step3: Moderator     
CEO procedural fairness   -0.18 -0.2 
R2   0.26  
R2 change   0.03  
F    3.05*  
F change   1.91  
Step4: Interactions     
CEO fairness X Informational 
diversity    0.08 
CEO fairness X Power 
centralization     0.23+ 
R2    0.31 
R2 change    0.05 
F     2.79* 
F change    1.76 




Table 17: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for the Effects of Conflict Antecedents on Affective Conflict 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Step1: Control variables     
Team size 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.20 
Age diversity 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.17 
Gender diversity -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
     
R2 0.06    
F 1.24    
Step2: Main effects     
Power centralization  -0.22+ -2.44* -0.21+ 
Informational diversity  0.47** 0.46** 0.45** 
R2  0.36   
R2 change  0.29**   
F   5.84**   
F change  12.01**   
Step3: Moderator     
CEO procedural fairness   0.09 0.00 
R2   0.36  
R2 change   0.01  
F    4.92*  
F change   0.54  
Step4: Interactions     
CEO fairness X Informational 
diversity    -0.13 
CEO fairness X Power 
centralization    -0.07 
R2    0.38 
R2 change    0.02 
F     3.79* 
F change    0.61 




Hypothesis 1 predicted that TMT informational diversity is positively related to 
TMT cognitive conflict. As indicated in model 2 (β = 0.34, p<0.01) of Table 16, after 
taking into account the control variables, informational diversity was positively related to 
cognitive conflict, thereby supporting hypothesis 1.  Surprisingly, against my earlier 
argument, it was indicated in model 2 (β = -0.47, p<0.01) of Table 17 that informational 
diversity was negatively related to TMT affective conflict. 
Hypothesis 2a and 2b predicted that power centralization is negatively related to 
TMT cognitive conflict and affective conflict, respectively.  As indicated in model 2 (β = 
-0.31, p<0.01) of Table 16, there was support for hypothesis 2a.  The negative 
relationship between power centralization and affective conflict, as shown in model 2 (β 
= -0.22, p<0.10) of Table 17, however, was only marginally significant. Hypothesis 2b, 
therefore, was partially supported.   
Hypothesis 3 predicated that CEO procedural fairness enhances the positive 
effects of TMT informational diversity on cognitive conflict. As indicated in model 4 of 
Table 16, the effects were non-significant and therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.  
Hypothesis 4a predicted that CEO procedural fairness weakens the negative effects of 
power centralization on TMT cognitive conflict. As shown in model 4 (β = 0.23, p<0.10) 
of Table 16, there was partial support for this hypothesis.  The interaction effect was 
further portrayed in Figure 4. Specifically, when the CEO provided a higher level of 
procedural fairness, power centralization was less negatively related to cognitive conflict. 
In contrast, for TMTs whose CEOs did not provide procedural fairness, a greater level of 
power centralization was highly negatively related to cognitive conflict.  Hypothesis 4b, 
which predicted that CEO procedural fairness enhances the negative effects of power 
 
centralization on TMT affective conflict, was not supported, since the effects, as shown 
in model 4 of Table 17, were non-significant. 
Figure 4: The Moderating Effects of CEO Fairness on the Relationship between Power Centralization and 
























Like Hypothesis 3, 4a and 4b, Hypothesis 5 was tested with a hierarchical 
moderated multiple regression analysis in which TMT cognitive conflict is the 
independent variable, CEO procedural fairness, the moderator, and affective conflict, the 
dependent variable. As indicated in model 4 of Table 18, there was no support for 
Hypothesis 5 that predicated that when a high level of CEO procedural fairness is 
present, TMT cognitive conflict is less likely to be associated with TMT affective 
conflict. 
To test Hypothesis 6a and 6b, a two-step hierarchical multiple regression model 
wherein product innovation was the dependent variable was conducted. As indicated in 
model 2 of Table 19, Hypothesis 6a that predicted that TMT cognitive conflict has a 
curvilinear (inverted-U shape) relationship with firm performance was not supported. 
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Hypothesis 6b that predicted TMT affective conflict is negatively related to firm 
performance, however, was partially supported (β = -0.37, p<0.10). 
 
 Table 18: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for the Relationship between Cognitive Conflict 
and Affective Conflict 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Step1: Control variables     
Team size 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.15 
Age diversity 0.19 0.20 0.18+ 0.18+ 
Gender diversity -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 
Power centralization -0.22+ -0.06 -0.1 -0.10 
Informational diversity 0.47** 0.30** 0.27* 0.27* 
R2 0.36    
F 5.84**    
Step2: Main effects     
Cognitive conflict  0.51** 0.55** 0.55** 
R2  0.56   
R2 change  0.20**   
F   10.81**   
F change  23.33**   
Step3: Moderator     
CEO procedural fairness   0.18+ 0.18+ 
R2   0.58  
R2 change   0.03+  
F    10.21**  
F change   3.48+  
Step4: Interactions     
CEO fairness X 
Cognitive conflict    0.00 
R2    0.58 
R2 change    0.00 
F     8.76** 
F change    0.00 







    
Table 19: Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for the Effects of Conflict on Firm Innovation 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Step1: Control variables   
R&D investment 0.12 0.22 
Team size -0.06 -0.02 
Age diversity 0.23 0.32* 
Gender diversity 0.06 0.03 
Power centralization -0.10 -0.18 
Informational diversity -0.04 0.13 
R2 0.06  
F 0.54  
Step2: Main effects   
Cognitive conflict  0.06 
Cognitive conflict squared  -0.13 
Affective conflict  -0.37+ 
R2  0.16 
R2 change  0.10+ 
F   1.02 
F change  1.91+ 
Note:+ = P<0.1; * = P<0.05; ** = P<0.01  
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Integrated Analysis of Study 1 and Study 2 
 In line with the expected benefits of conducting two complimentary studies, one 
field and one lab, the results from the two studies in this dissertation were either 
consistent or complimentary to each other, revealing support for the research model of 
this dissertation.  In the following, I compared and integrated the findings in both studies 
with a focus on the antecedents to conflict, moderating effects of CEO procedural 
fairness, and conflict outcomes, respectively. Figure 5 shows the hypothesized model; 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show models that highlighted significant hypothesized 
relationships, and Table 20 provides a summary of the research findings from both 
studies.  
 
Antecedents to Conflict 
 As indicated in the hypothesized model (See Figure 5), three relationships (H1, 
H2a, and H2b) were hypothesized to examine the effects of informational diversity and 
power centralization on cognitive conflict and affective conflict.  Hypothesis 1 predicted 
a positive relationship between informational diversity and cognitive conflict; Hypothesis 
2a and 2b, however, predicted a negative relationship between power centralization and 
cognitive conflict and between power centralization and affective conflict respectively. 
As summarized in Table 20, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2a gained support from both 
the field and the lab study. Hypothesis 2b gained partial support from the field study but 
no support from the lab study.  Unexpectedly, a strong positive relationship between 
informational diversity and affective conflict was found in the field study, but not in the 
lab study.  
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Figure 5: Hypothesized Model 
 


















































































Product Innovation * Note: Standardized beta or F score for only those hypothesized relationships that were significant from 
the regression analyses/ANOVA was reported  70
    
Table 20: Finding Summary 
Hypothesis Field Study Lab Study 
H1: Informational diversity is positively related to TMT cognitive conflict Support Support 
H2a: Power centralization is negatively related to TMT cognitive conflict Support Partial Support 
H2b: Power centralization is negatively related to TMT affective conflict Support No Support 
H3: CEO procedural fairness strengthens the relationship of H1 No Support Support 
H4a: CEO procedural fairness weakens the relationship of H2a Partial Support No Support 
H4b: CEO procedural fairness strengthens the relationship of H2b No Support No Support 
H5: CEO procedural fairness decouples cognitive conflict from affective conflict No Support Support 
H6a: TMT cognitive conflict is curvilinearly related to firm performance No Support No Support 
H6b: TMT affective conflict is negatively related to firm performance Support Support 
 
 
CEO Procedural Fairness as a Moderator  
 
Four relationships (H3, H4a, H4b, and H5) were hypothesized to test the 
moderating effects of CEO procedural fairness. Hypothesis 3 predicted that CEO 
procedural fairness enhances the positive effects of informational diversity on cognitive 
conflict. This relationship was not supported in the field study, but supported in the lab 
study. Hypothesis 4a predicted that CEO procedural fairness weakens the negative effects 
of power centralization on cognitive conflict. Partial support was found in the field study, 
but received no support in the lab study at all. Hypothesis 4b, which predicted that CEO 
procedural fairness strengthens the negative effects of power centralization on affective 
conflict, was not supported in either study.  
Hypothesis 5 predicted a negative moderating effect of CEO procedural fairness 
on the positive relationship between both types of conflict. While both studies found a 
positive relationship between cognitive and affective conflict (See Figure 6&7), only the 




    
Outcomes of Conflict 
 Two hypotheses (H6a and H6b) were used to test the effects of TMT conflict on 
firm outcomes. Hypothesis 6a predicted an inverted U shaped curvilinear relationship 
between conflict and firm outcomes. Neither significant direct nor curvilinear effects of 
cognitive conflict were found in either study. Hypothesis 6b predicted a negative direct 
relationship of TMT affective conflict on firm performance. It gained full support in the 
lab study where market share is the outcome variable and partial support in the field 
study where product innovation was used to measure firm performance. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to address three research questions: (1) What 
are the antecedent conditions that contribute to the development of conflict within TMTs? 
(2) how can TMTs develop constructive conflict profiles – those that simultaneously have 
relatively high levels of cognitive conflict but low levels of or little affective conflict? 
and (3) how does TMT conflict relate to firm performance? Two complementary studies 
were conducted to enhance both the internal validity and the generalizability of this 
research: an experimental study of 77 project teams with senior business-major 
undergraduates at a US-based university, and an in-depth field study of 61 TMTs of US-
based high-technology firms.  The consistent results from both studies revealed that:  (1) 
TMT informational diversity was positively related to TMT cognitive conflict, however, 
TMT power centralization was negatively related to TMT cognitive conflict; (2) a TMT 
with a higher level of CEO procedural fairness was more likely to report a constructive 
conflict profile; and (3) TMT affective conflict was detrimental to firm performance. In 
this chapter, I will discuss the contributions of these findings to the literature, research 
methodology, and managerial practice, and limitation and future research.  
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 In the following, I will discuss the findings with a focus on the antecedents to 
conflict, moderating effects of CEO procedural fairness, and conflict outcomes, 
respectively. 
Antecedents to conflict 
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As indicated in Table 20, hypothesis 1, which predicted a positive relationship 
between TMT informational diversity and TMT cognitive conflict, was supported in both 
the field and the lab studies. This finding suggests that the more diverse a TMT is with 
regards to the top executives’ expertise and experiences, the more likely conflicting 
opinions are raised in the TMT decision making process.  Consistent with the results of 
Jehn et al.’s (1999) work, this finding indicates that the notion that team informational 
diversity contributes to the development of team cognitive conflict is applicable to 
organizational upper echelons as well. This finding also provides empirical support to 
TMT theorists who have suggested that CEOs who wish to create an environment 
conducive to encouraging constructive debate that can support effective decision making 
should strive to create a diverse top executive team (Eisenhardet et al., 1997b). 
While I argued earlier in the dissertation that informational diversity was unlikely 
to lead to affective conflict because it did not provide any salient anchor variable on 
which social categorization effects can take place, the field study revealed significant 
negative effects. This caused me to reflect on the theory and reexamine the 
operationalization of informational diversity in the field study.  
Categorization effects are the primary mechanism through which a team develops 
affective conflict (Pelled, 1996a, 1996b). Categorization theory argues that people have a 
subconscious tendency to sort each other into social categories based upon salient 
demographic attributes such as age, race, tenure etc. (Tajfel, 1972). Since the information 
about the environments is abundant, categorization help simplify and make the external 
environments more predictable and controllable (Pelled et al., 1999; Tajfel, 1972). Once 
categorization occurs, people strive to develop a positive social identity by showing 
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favoritism to the members of their own social categories and resentment and 
discriminations to those in other categories (Tajfel, 1972). As team diversity increases, 
members from different social categories tend to have more interactions with each other 
and are like to encounter with each other’s negative stereotypes and self-serving biases 
(Pelled, 1996a). As a result, affective conflict becomes more pronounced.  
Constrained by the difficulty of collecting the data of top executives’ knowledge 
base and experiences directly, I followed the literature to use the mean of team tenure 
diversity, educational diversity and functional background diversity as the proxy of 
informational diversity (Jehn et al., 1999). Since tenure, education and functional 
background are important reference variables often used by top executives to identify and 
categorize each other (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), they are likely to become the 
sources for the development of TMT affective conflict.  
Hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b predicted a negative association of TMT power 
centralization with TMT cognitive conflict and TMT affective conflict, respectively. Both 
hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b gained support in the field study and hypothesis 2a was 
partially supported in the lab study. These findings suggest that conflict is less likely to 
emerge in a TMT where power is disproportionably concentrated on the “core” TMT 
members compared to in a TMT where power is relatively evenly distributed among all 
top executives.  
There have been two contradictory views in the corporate politics literature 
regarding how power distributions affect the interaction among top executives. Some 
scholars argued that when power is centralized with one or a few “core” members, less 
powerful members are likely to make alliances to seek stronger control for their own 
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interests during decision making process, and that the emergence of alliances would 
crystallize as endless fight among different interest parties (e.g., Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988). Others have instead argued that an imbalanced power structure, in 
other words, a TMT with a high level of power centralization, is less likely to lead to the 
emergence of conflict. This is because less powerful parties feel reluctant to raise 
conflicting viewpoints to those of the “core” members since they are afraid that their 
distinct opinions, if voiced, might be interpreted by the core members as deliberate 
subversions or personal attacks (Ocasio, 1994; Pfeffer, 1981; Shen & Cannella, 2002). 
The findings in both the field and the lab study in this research provide strong empirical 
evidence in support of the second view.  
Unexpectedly, no relationship was found between power centralization and 
affective conflict in the lab study. A plausible explanation may lie in one limitation of the 
lab study design. That is, while the lab study employed monetary rewards as an incentive 
to promote participants’ engagement in the task, in post-experimental interviews, some 
participants indicated that they cared more about being perceived as cooperative and 
helpful than winning the game and the money by fighting hard to advocate that their 
opinions be adopted by the team. As evidenced, compared to the mean level of cognitive 
conflict, the mean level of affective conflict was a lot lower (mean of affective conflict = 
5.29; mean of cognitive conflict =11.85). Future research on conflict in controlled 
experimental settings may need to employ alternative methods to create variance on 
affective conflict.     
In summary, the above findings regarding the antecedents to conflict suggest that 
cognitive conflict is likely to emerge in TMTs where top executives have diverse 
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expertise and experiences, and are highly empowered. These findings contribute to the 
literature in three ways. First, they contribute to conflict research. Unlike existing conflict 
research that has been primarily centered on surface-level, static demographic diversity 
variables such as age diversity and gender diversity (Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 
2002) as the conflict predictors, this research went beyond demographic diversity and 
attempted to address deeper-level, more dynamic antecedents variables to conflict, 
including informational diversity and power centralization (Priem et al., 1999). The 
findings suggest that beyond demographic diversity, informational diversity and power 
centralization are important predictors to team conflict.  
Second, the findings make contributions by beginning to integrate the 
organization behavior teams literature with the TMT literature. Specifically, this research 
advanced the examination of a team level construct, conflict, into the upper echelons of 
organizations. This is important because the task environments and nature of executive 
teams differ substantially from those of work teams or small groups and therefore the 
results regarding the same relationships in these two different contexts could be different 
(Cohen & Bailey, 1997). Indeed, the finding regarding the relationship between 
informational diversity and cognitive conflict in this work is consistent with that of 
existing conflict research with a focus on work teams and small groups (e.g., Jehn et al., 
1999). This suggests that while TMTs differ from work teams substantially with regards 
to task environments and composition, it is important and useful for TMT and teams 
research to draw upon each other for theory development in their own specific field. 
Finally, the findings make contributions to TMT decision making research. The 
associations between TMT characteristics and TMT process variables have been largely 
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ignored and remained unknown in the literature, which has been a source of ambiguity 
regarding how TMTs relate to firm performance as considered in the TMT decision 
making literature (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Knight et al., 1999; Smith et al., 1994). 
The findings regarding the relationships of informational diversity and power 
centralization, TMT characteristics variables, and TMT conflict, a TMT decision making 
process variable, provide significant insights to addressing the following important 
research questions: what affects TMT decision making? and how do TMTs affect firm 
performance?  
Moderating effects of CEO procedural fairness 
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that CEO procedural fairness would further 
enhanced the positive effects of TMT informational diversity on TMT cognitive conflict, 
was supported only in the lab study. This finding perhaps suggests that informational 
diversity may be more likely to lead to cognitive conflict when the level of CEO 
procedural fairness is higher (see Figure 2). Figure 2 also indicates an interesting 
contrast.  It suggests that at a high level of informational diversity, TMTs with high CEO 
procedural fairness experience a higher level of cognitive conflict than those with low 
CEO procedural fairness. However, when the level of informational diversity is low, 
TMTs with low CEO procedural fairness report a higher level of cognitive conflict.  
These finding supports the notion proposed earlier in this dissertation that top 
executives’ different expertise and experiences are not necessarily reflected on their 
viewpoints and therefore lead to heterogeneous opinion inputs during the decision 
making process, unless they have been encouraged to do so. As indicated in Figure 2, the 
presence or absence of informational diversity has much less pronounced effects on 
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cognitive conflict, when TMTs experience a low level of CEO procedural fairness. 
However, when the level of CEO procedural fairness is high, the effects of informational 
diversity on cognitive conflict become much stronger. 
As a strong believer of the above theory, I attributed the failure of hypothesis 3 in 
the field study to its limited internal validity (Brewer, 2000). Likely, there were some 
uncontrolled variables in the field context such as organizational culture, CEO leadership 
style, CEO conflict management strategy, etc., which may have interfered with the 
interaction of CEO procedural fairness and informational diversity. For instance, even if 
the CEO did not aggressively promote procedural fairness within the TMT, if the 
organization had an open culture which encouraged executives to actively involve in the 
TMT decision making process (Amason & Sapienza, 1997), the effects of CEO 
procedural fairness on the relationship between informational diversity and cognitive 
conflict are likely to have been mitigated. Future study may need to control for 
organizational culture and other CEO leadership variables when examining the effects of 
CEO procedural fairness in a field context. To advance our understandings of TMT 
conflict emergence process and TMT conflict management, it may be also useful to 
address the moderating effects of organizational culture and other CEO leadership 
variables on the relationships between informational diversity and cognitive conflict.  
Hypothesis 4a, which predicted that CEO procedural fairness would weaken the 
negative effects of TMT power centralization on TMT cognitive conflict, was partially 
supported in the field study.  It perhaps suggests that power centralization is less 
negatively related to cognitive conflict when the level of CEO procedural fairness is 
higher (see Figure 4). Figure 4 also indicates that TMTs at a high level of power 
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centralization experience a higher level of cognitive conflict when their CEOs are more 
procedurally fair. However, when the level of power centralization is low, CEO 
procedural fairness has little or even no effects on cognitive conflict.   
These findings supports the notion of motivation and politics theorists that when 
power is concentrated on the CEO or a few core members, those executives with a 
relatively lower level of power may feel reluctant to voice their distinct opinions because 
of the fear of being interpreted by the “core” members as deliberate subversion unless 
they perceive a high level of procedural fairness (Colquitt et al., 2001; Kernan & Hanges, 
2002). As indicated in Figure 4, when the level of CEO procedural fairness is low, power 
centralization has much stronger negative effects on cognitive conflict. However, when 
TMTs experience a high level of CEO procedural fairness, the effects of power 
centralization become much less pronounced. 
Unexpectedly, this hypothesis was not supported in the lab study. One plausible 
reason is that the manipulation of CEO procedural fairness may have actually interfered 
with that of power centralization (r=0.11). For instance, participants who were 
manipulated to be procedurally fair and powerful at the same time might eventually end 
up being either extremely nice but indecisive or being autocratic since they did not have 
experiences to well place themselves in such a sophisticated management position. 
Indeed, post-game semi-structured interviews with participants revealed their confusion 
on the complicated manipulations.  This observation suggests that future research with 
students as the subjects need to offer effective pre-experiment training to make sure that 
they understand the experiments well and are able to effectively act in line with the 
manipulations. 
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Hypothesis 4b predicted that CEO procedural fairness would further strengthen 
the negative effects of TMT power centralization on TMT affective conflict. This 
hypothesis was not supported in either study. This has caused me to reconsider the logic 
behind the hypothesis. My original argument was that the norm of trust and respect in a 
TMT derived from a high level of CEO procedural fairness would further diminish the 
level of interpersonal clashes among top executives, if there was any, caused by a uneven 
power distribution. An alternative prediction is that instead of interacting with power 
centralization, CEO procedural fairness may affect the emergence of affective conflict 
directly (r=0.50 in the lab study; r=0.04 in the field study). Affective conflict derives 
from the disruption of mutual trust and respect among top executives, and can occur 
when intense debates over the content of strategic decisions are misunderstood as 
personal attacks (Simons & Peterson, 2000). CEO procedural fairness is able to help 
rebuild such trust and respect among members (Colquitt et al., 2001), and therefore 
constrain the emergence of affective conflict.  To test this notion, I conducted a 
hierarchical regression with informational diversity, power centralization, and CEO 
procedural fairness as independent variables predicting affective conflict. The results 
showed a significant direct negative effect of CEO procedural fairness on affective 
conflict in the lab study (β = -0.27, p<0.05).  
Hypothesis 5 predicted that CEO procedural fairness would decouple the 
association of cognitive conflict and affective conflict. This hypothesis gained support in 
the lab study, suggesting that cognitive conflict is less positively related to affective 
conflict when the level of CEO procedural fairness is higher (see Figure 3). These 
findings confirmed the notion in the conflict literature that when there is a low level of or 
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little trust  and respect among team members, cognitive conflict is likely to be coupled 
with affective conflict because the harsh language and aggressive arguments associated 
with a high level of cognitive conflict are likely to be interpreted by team members as 
personal attack or deliberate subversion, or people who dislike each other may 
deliberately dispute each other’s opinions, thus providing a basis for interpersonal 
incompatibility (Simons & Peterson, 2000). The effective way to decouple these two 
types of conflict is to rebuild mutual trust and attitudinal harmony among team members, 
which can be fostered by a high level of CEO procedural fairness (Colquitt et al., 2002). 
Surprisingly, this hypothesis failed in the field study. I attribute the failure to 
uncontrolled CEO leadership variables. Besides CEO procedural fairness, other aspects 
of CEO leadership such as the CEO’s conflict management strategy could also interact 
with the cognitive conflict-affective conflict relationship, and therefore should have been 
controlled for. Conflict management strategy refers to the techniques implemented by 
team members to control or solve conflict (DeChurch & Marks, 2001).  A CEO may 
handle conflict with a strategy of avoidance, accommodation, competition, collaboration, 
or compromise (Rahim, 1992).  Perhaps, CEOs with similar level of procedural fairness 
may take on different conflict management strategy in interacting with the conflict 
emergence process.  This may lead to the failure of the interaction of CEO procedural 
fairness on the relationship between cognitive conflict and affective conflict. Future 
research needs to examine how CEO conflict management strategy and other CEO 
leadership variables may moderate the association of cognitive conflict and affective 
conflict. 
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Overall, the above findings make at least two contributions. First, they contribute 
to conflict research by answering one of the research questions: How can a TMT 
establish a constructive conflict profile-a relatively high level of cognitive conflict but a 
very low level of or little affective conflict? Although more research is needed, the 
findings suggest that a high level of CEO procedural fairness is likely to further enhance 
the positive effects of informational diversity and weaken the negative effects of power 
centralization on cognitive conflict, at the same time, decouple the association between 
cognitive conflict and affective conflict, and consequently result in a constructive TMT 
conflict profile. 
These findings make contributions to TMT research as well. The focus of 
traditional TMT research has been placed on TMT characteristics instead of individual 
difference. As a result, the unique role that CEOs may play in moderating the interaction 
among TMT members has been largely ignored (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  These 
findings highlight the importance of taking the unique role of CEO leadership into 
consideration in addressing TMT decision making process.  
Conflict outcomes 
Hypothesis 6a predicted that TMT cognitive conflict was curvilinearly (Inverted 
U shape) related to firm performance. This hypothesis was not supported. Moreover, 
inconsistent with the literature (e.g., Amason, 1996; Jehn et al.., 1999), no linear, positive 
relationship of cognitive conflict and firm performance was found in either study. One 
plausible reason for this failure in the field study is that I used the number of new 
products introduced within the last year before the time point when I collected conflict 
data to measure innovation.  The inconsistent measurement timing for the independent 
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and dependent variables may account for the failure of this hypothesis in the field study. 
As to the lab study, the reason may lie in the short gaming period design: 15 minutes for 
one round of game may not give players enough time to transfer the conflicting opinions 
into high quality decisions.   
The failure of hypothesis 6a in both studies also caused me to reflect on the theory 
underlying that prediction.  While the hypothesis was not supported, I strongly believe 
that there should be an optimal level of cognitive conflict for a specific TMT in order to 
enjoy all the benefits associated with a constructive debate without destroying team 
cohesiveness.  The mixed findings in the conflict literature regarding the cognitive 
conflict-team performance relationship actually provide an indirect support to the above 
viewpoint (see De dreu & Weingart, 2003 for a review). A more fine-grained longitudinal 
study that is able to observe the conflict evolution process needs to be conducted to retest 
hypothesis 6a.    
Hypothesis 6b, which predicted a negative effect of TMT affective conflict on 
firm performance was supported in the lab study and partially supported in the field study. 
This finding confirms the notion in the conflict literature that affective conflict is 
detrimental to team outcomes because it disturbs effective communication and 
cooperation, consumes resources and energy, and hurts team cohesiveness (Janssen et al., 
1999; Jehn, 1994, 1995; Pelled et al., 1999). Specifically, it suggests that in the context of 
TMTs, affective conflict leads to poor quality strategic decisions, which in turn constrains 
a firm’s financial competitiveness and innovation capability. Such a finding also provides 
evidence to the pre-assumed theory that the research model of this dissertation has been 
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drawn upon. That is, a very low level of or little affective conflict is preferable for TMT 
decision making.    
 
Contributions to Methodology 
The design of this dissertation makes three methodological contributions. First, 
the two-study design enables this research enjoy both internal and external validity. It 
first examined the research model with an experiment that enjoys a high level of internal 
validity and then generalized the examination in a set of high-tech industries. The 
consistent findings in both studies, although not entirely overlapping, provide unique 
support for the research model.  
Second, the design evidences that a well-designed lab study can also be used for 
TMT research. Traditional TMT research relies on either archival sources or surveys to 
collect data (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). These data collection methods constrain 
researchers’ ability to observe TMT decision making process, consequently leaving TMT 
process research a “black box” in the TMT literature (Laurence, 1997). Lab studies, 
however, offer researchers the possibility and flexibility to simulate, observe and control 
the TMT decision making process.  
Finally, I used different methods to measure informational diversity and power 
centralization in the two studies. The overall consistent findings suggest that it is 
effective and valid to use the average of TMT tenure diversity, TMT educational 
diversity and TMT functional diversity as the proxy of TMT informational diversity, and 
to use scenarios with different power structure to manipulate power centralization. This 
observation provides important methodological guideline for future TMT research.  
 85
    
 
Contributions to Managerial Practice 
This research has certain practical implications. First, it identified informational 
diversity and power centralization as important predictors to TMT conflict.  CEOs who 
would like to finalize strategic decisions based on a large variety of inputs may need to 
intentionally recruit top executives with diverse expertise and experiences. In addition, to 
promote top executives’ active involvement in the decision making process, a relatively 
balanced power structure needs to be enforced. In other words, the CEO needs to 
empower other top executives so as to inspire a healthy discussion of strategic decisions.   
Second, this research provides CEOs a solution to managing TMT conflict. The 
common problem most CEOs and organizational leaders have encountered is that healthy 
fight over strategic decisions can quickly turn destructive (Eisenhardt et al., 1997b). For 
instance, a different opinion meant as a substantial remark can be interpreted as personal 
attack. Anxiety and frustration over difficult choices that intertwine with personality may 
evolve into interpersonal tension and disliking. Such misattribution effects, as noted 
earlier, may derive from the lack of mutual trust among top executives, which is not 
unusual across the TMTs of American-based companies (Eisenhardt et al., 1997b). A 
procedurally fair CEO, however, is able to foster the generation of a team norm of trust 
(Colquitt et al., 2002), and therefore to decouple TMT cognitive conflict from TMT 
affective conflict. This research highlights that CEOs need to be fair and be perceived fair 
by other members during decision making process in order to encourage top executives to 
fight for the optimal strategic decisions without destroying their ability to work together. 
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Finally, it provides a solution to establishing a constructive TMT conflict profile. 
This research found that TMTs with a high level of informational diversity and a low 
level of power centralization were more likely to develop a high level of cognitive 
conflict but a low level of or little affective conflict when the level of CEO procedural 
fairness was high. This suggests that to better enjoy the benefits of a constructive conflict 
profile, the CEOs needs to establish a team with diverse expertise and backgrounds, 
empower other top executives and are fair and perceived fair during decision making 
process simultaneously.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Like most studies, this dissertation is not without limitations. There are at least 
three limitations as follows. First, this research examined TMT conflict with its focus on 
the most recognized types, cognitive conflict and affective conflict, without addressing 
other types of conflict identified in the literature, such as process conflict (Jehn, 1997). 
The reason I specifically focused on cognitive and affective conflict is that these two 
types of conflict have been often observed as highly intertwined in TMTs and that a 
solution to decouple them has been urgently called upon (Eisenhardet et al., 1997b). This, 
however, does not exclude the necessity to address process conflict in future research.  
Process conflict refers to the disagreements among team members regarding how 
to accomplish the tasks, such as resource and responsibility allocation (Jehn, 1997). It is 
not unusual that top executives fight hard for favorable resource allocation for their own 
departments and that there are often conflicting duty allocation among TMT members 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Process conflict opens an interesting avenue to examine 
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how conflict over resource and responsibility allocation may affect TMT decision making 
and firm performance. 
Second, this study specifically focused on one aspect of CEO leadership, CEO 
procedural fairness, as the solution to establishing a constructive TMT conflict profile. 
On the one hand, this finding may only explain part of the story of how CEO leadership 
may affect the conflict emergence process. On the other hand, it opens an interesting 
research avenue for both conflict scholars and TMT researchers to address TMT conflict 
management. Future research needs to look into other aspects of CEO leadership, such as 
CEO leadership style and conflict management strategies, and to examine how they may 
interact with the conflict emergence process and the processes through which conflict 
affects firm outcomes.   
Third, while the two-study research design has its strengths, both studies have 
their own limitations. One limitation in the lab study is that few management experiences 
that student participants had might actually constrain their interpretations and 
implementation of the manipulation messages. This in turn led to the failure of some 
hypotheses in the lab setting (e.g., H4a).  For instance, as noted before, when the 
manipulations for a high level of power centralization and a high level of CEO procedural 
fairness were conducted simultaneously on the same participants, they might end up with 
behaving toward an extreme end, either being extremely nice and cooperative or being 
autocratic. It is suggested that future research with students as the subjects need to offer 
more effective pre-experiment training to make sure that they understand the experiments 
well and are able to effectively act in line with the manipulations. Another limitation for 
the lab study is that only a limited level of affective conflict was observed due to 
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insufficient incentive mechanism design-monetary reward. This limitation may, to some 
extent, account for the insignificance for some affective conflict-related hypotheses (e.g., 
H2b & H4b). Future conflict research needs to take more effective incentive mechanisms 
to promote participants as emotionally involved in the experimental setting as desired.   
One main limitation for the field study lies in its cross-sectional design. This 
made it hard to address any causal relationships. For instance, instead of arguing that 
affective conflict was detrimental to firm innovation, one could propose that it was the 
poor innovation outcomes that led people to blame for each others, thus providing the 
basis for affective conflict to emerge. Moreover, a cross-sectional study may make it 
difficult to test a curvilinear relationship, particularly when the sample size is small. 
Future research need employ a more fine-grained longitudinal design to study TMT 
conflict. Such a study will help address the mixed findings regarding the cognitive 
conflict-team performance relationship in the literature as well.  
 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation addressed three research topics in the conflict literature: TMT 
conflict antecedents, TMT conflict management, and TMT conflict outcomes. With two 
complimentary studies, one experiment with 77 project-teams with business-major 
undergraduate students and one field study of 66 TMTs of US-based high-tech firms, this 
dissertation found that (1) informational diversity and power centralization were 
important predictors to TMT conflict. Specifically, TMTs with a high level of 
informational diversity and a decentralized power structure were more likely to develop a 
high level of cognitive conflict; (2) TMTs with a  procedurally fair CEO were more likely 
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to develop a constructive conflict profile, namely one with a relatively high level of 
cognitive conflict but a low level of or little affective conflict, by further enhancing the 
positive effects of informational diversity and decoupling the association of cognitive 
conflict and affective conflict simultaneously; and (3) TMT affective conflict were 
negatively related to firm performance.  
 While the findings of this dissertation may leave many questions unanswered, I 
believe that TMT informational diversity, power centralization and CEO leadership are 
important factors for future research to address TMT conflict. In particular, CEO 
leadership deserves more research attention in attempt to answer the following questions: 
how does TMT conflict emerge and develop over time? how can a TMT effectively 
manage conflict? and how can a TMT turn a constructive conflict profile into favorable 





    
APPENDIX A 
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for All Participants 
Game Purpose 
In this game simulation, every four people will work closely as the top managers (CEO, 
CMO, CTO, and CFO) of a company in the Cellular Communication industry to compete 
against the computer for LARGER MARKET SHARE.  
 
Game Background 
Developed by Bell Laboratories in the 1960's, cellular phone service derives its name from 
small regions— called cells— into which a service area is divided. Each cell is equipped 
with a low-power transmitter/receiver known as a base station. Ideally, cell coverage of a 
service area would be total and unduplicated; in reality, however, cells frequently overlap 
or leave gaps due to obstructions. 
It is possible to increase a cell's capacity by frequency reuse and by adding more 
radio waves. Frequency reuse consists of cells not adjacent to one other that can use the 
same frequency without interfering with each other. Cell-splitting is sometimes used to 
increase capacity as well. This method involves dividing a cell by adding more, less 
powerful base stations. There are limits to how many times a cell can be split, however; 
extreme cell density can result in mutual channel interference. 
Cellular communications require a cellular telephone and a subscription with a cellular 
phone company. In addition, there are some limitations and inconveniences associated with 
cellular phone use. To make cellular calls, callers must be within range of the service 
areas. Signal quality is not as good as on standard telephones, and if a cellular phone user 
moves into an area that is not covered by his/her cellular service company, he/she will not 
be able to make or receive calls. The charge for cellular service is usually a one-time 
activation fee and an air charge for each minute of both incoming and outgoing calls. Some 
companies offer supplementary services such as paging and data transmission. Industry 
executives have identified two types of customers: business users (who use cellular 
services mostly at work) and private users (who use cellular services outside work). 
 
Game Simulation Procedure 
The whole game takes 10 rounds to finish, each round representing one year in the real 
business world. In each round, all the four members work together to figure out the best 
strategy (A combination of a set of strategic actions) to maximize the market share of 
their company. Available strategic actions include:  Raising Capital, Advertising, Sales 
Forces, R&D Investment, New Market Entry, and Radio Wave Capacity. Each team 
needs to follow the procedures below to fulfill the entire simulation: 
1. Before the game starts, each member in a team needs to fill out Part A of a 
survey, which involves basic participant background information.  
2. Then, teams may start to make one round of game practice to get familiar with 
game operation. After it is finished, reset the game, and wait for the game 
coordinator for further instructions. Do not start the formal game simulation until 
the coordinator tells you to do so. 
    
3. When the 8th round of game is finished, pause the game, and fill out Part B of the 
survey. Do not continue with the game until a coordinator tells you to do so. 
4. After the entire game is finished, please send the files of xxxINFO.TXT, 
xxxINFB.TXT, and xxxRVW.TXT to the address at ljiang@rhsmith.umd.edu. 
The subject should be worded like this “A11 game simulation”. A11 is an 
assigned team number. 
 
Incentives 
Every member in those teams whose market share ranks among top 10% out of all teams 
will win $50. There will be about 80 teams involved in this game. When all games are 
finished, the winners will be identified and informed, however, the bonus check may take 
a few weeks to get sent out. Good luck! 
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APPENDIX B 
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for Participants 
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CEO (HD, HF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 




Business users and private 
users are both important 
for Celcom 21 to establish 
its market leadership. 
Business users may be the 
major consumers in the 
early stage of cellular 
phone industry, Over time, 
private users may account 
for significant market 
share as well. However, if 
we do not advertise for the 
private users from the 
beginning, how will they 
choose our company later? 
So let us focus on both of 
them. 
Dealers and direct 
salaries-sales forces 
are both very 
important. Dealers 
are motivated by 
commission, but 
harder to control; 
direct force may have 
less motivation, but 
easier to manage. 
Celcom 21 needs to 
make a balanced 
configuration of these 
two types of sales 
forces (50 to 50) 
N/A 
As long as a new market is 
available, Celcom 21 
should buy the license to 
get into the market 
immediately, at any cost, 
because  (1) new market 
entry is one of the most 
important means to expand 
market share; (2) a later 
entry may cost significantly 
more than otherwise; and 
(3)  the risk associated with 
first mover is very little, 
because Wall Street is very 




Your Role as the CEO 
As the CEO, you are responsible for finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT 
(top management team), individuals from different functional backgrounds may approach 
the same strategic issue with different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate 
limited financial resource to enhance a company’s financial performance, a Chief 
Marketing Officer (CMO) is more likely to highlight the importance of such marketing 
activities as advertising and would suggest investing more in marketing activities, while a 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore 
suggest more investment into the R&D area. While top executives’ opinions are likely to 
be different and even contradictory, the best decisions occur when everyone has a chance 
to express their position and the team works to integrate the various perspectives of 
different team members. Therefore, you are strongly encouraged to (1) provide all team 
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members equal opportunities for contributing to strategic decisions, (2) make sure that all 
team members’ concerns are given appropriate consideration, (3) provide all team 
members with equal opportunities to support, challenge and refute your viewpoints, (4) 
clarify decisions when requested by any team members, and (5) listen to every member’s 
concerns before making decisions.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating 
your performance as the CEO in doing these five things.  
  







CEOThe decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power.  94
    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CFO (HD, HF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 
  






Radio wave capacity 
CFO 
Operating profit is one of 
the most critical financial 
sources to fuel company’s 
strategies. While the wall 
street seems optimistic on 
the cellular industry 
contemporarily, we should
be very careful in raising 
capital through external 
markets. No shareholders 
would like to support a 
TMT who leads to 
consecutive negative 
profit for years. To raise  
 
no more than 50% of the 
company's credit ceiling, 
upon need,  is probably 
the best financing 
strategy.  
Given the limited financial 
resources, and the fact that 
the market growth is being 
fueled primarily by 
business users (look at the 
subscriber distribution), it 
doesn't make any sense to 
advertise for private uses. 
Advertising spending 
should be concentrated on 
business users as opposed 
to private users as long as 
the percentage of private 
subscribers among all 
customers doesn’t increase 
significantly. 
 N/A N/A N/A 
As our market expands, 
the communication is 
becoming more crowded 
and even leads to 
disconnection during 
phone call. This has 
started to badly influence 
our market share. I agree 
R&D is a way to enhance 
the radio capacity by 
ourselves, however, it 
may take too long to meet 
our needs. Our 
competitors who buy 
radio wave capacity 
directly from the 
government are taking 
away our market share. It 
is time to significantly 
buy in radio wave 
capacity    
 
Your Role as the CFO 
As the Chief Financial Officer, you are primarily in charge of financial issues. However, 
your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved in the 
entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic decisions 
in all areas of activities. 
 







The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power.  95
    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CMO (HD, HF, HP) 
 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 





capital Advertising Sales forces R&D investment 





CMO  N/A N/A 
A large and strong group of 
dealers paid on commission 
will enable Celcom 21 to 
acquire new customers while
retaining flexibility; indeed, 
dealers, unlike 
direct/salaried sales force, 
get paid only if they sell. 
Therefore, I suggest to 
 
primarily invest in dealers- 
to have more dealers and 
increase their commission 
While the introduction of new 
technology to market is 
probably important for Celcom 
21's long term growth, Celcom 
21 should prioritize its 
financial resources on market 
expansion, such as advertising 
and sales forces, instead of 
R&D because the market will 
not been ready for such 
innovative services  as data 
transmission and switchers in 
the near future. Even we have 
to invest in R&D, I’d suggest 
to buy in necessary 
technological resources instead 
of doing it ourselves, because 
the market is changing too fast 
and need quicker response. 
We should prioritize its 
business on its existing market. 
Only when its leadership has 
been established, it may move 
to another market. This is 
because 1), it is hard to manage 
the competition in a few 
markets at the same time, given 
the limited managerial 
capability and organizational 
resources and 2) there is 
uncertainty whether the growth 
in the new market will be as 
strong as in the existing ones.  
N/A 
Your Role as the CMO 
As the Chief Marketing Officer, you are primarily in charge of marketing issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 







The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power.  96
    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CTO (HD, HF, HP) 
 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
  




Radio wave capacity 
CTO 
Celcom 21 should raise as 
much fund as the credit 
ceiling allows. For a firm 
competing in a dynamic 
environment,  completely 
relying on its own 
operating profit to fuel its 
strategies is a mistake, 
because, otherwise, we 
will not have enough 
resources to catch up the 
technological trend and 
build up our leading 
position in the market.  
R&D is expensive, but 
critical for a high-tech firm 
like Celcom 21. The long-
term positive market 
growth associated with 
R&D will overcome the 
negative effects of the 
short-term debt.   
 N/A N/A 
Data transmission, clarity of 
sound, radio wave capacity and 
switchers are the four critical 
technologies that will 
significantly influence the 
quality of the services of our 
company. Industry reports have 
indicated that the quality of the 
services highly influence 
customer loyalty and therefore 
our market share. Therefore, the 
company should prioritize 
R&D. I suggest that more than 
10-15% firm resources should 
be invested in R&D, which is 
an industrial standard for high-
tech firms. 
N/A 
Industry reports have 
indicated that the quality of 
the services is being badly 
influenced by the increasing 
crowded communication. 
Therefore it is wise to 
somehow increase the radio 
wave capacity. However, I 
oppose to buy more radio 
wave capacity directly 
because of the following 
reasons. First, to expand radio 
wave capacity is very 
expensive. There are not extra 
resources for Celcom 21 to 
invest in it. More importantly, 
R&D on radio wave capacity 
is a better way than directly 
buying radio wave capacity. In 
so doing we are able to 
develop our own core 
competence. 
 
Your Role as the CTO 
As the Chief Technology Officer, you are primarily in charge of technological issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 






CEOThe decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power.  97
    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CEO (HD, HF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 




Business users and private 
users are both important 
for Celcom 21 to establish 
its market leadership. 
Business users may be the 
major consumers in the 
early stage of cellular 
phone industry, Over time, 
private users may account 
for significant market 
share as well. However, if 
we do not advertise for the 
private users from the 
beginning, how will they 
choose our company later? 
So let us focus on both of 
them. 
Dealers and direct 
salaries-sales forces 
are both very 
important. Dealers 
are motivated by 
commission, but 
harder to control; 
direct force may have 
less motivation, but 
easier to manage. 
Celcom 21 needs to 
make a balanced 
configuration of these 
two types of sales 
forces (50 to 50) 
N/A 
As long as a new market is 
available, Celcom 21 
should buy the license to 
get into the market 
immediately, at any cost, 
because  (1) new market 
entry is one of the most 
important means to expand 
market share; (2) a later 
entry may cost significantly 
more than otherwise; and 
(3)  the risk associated with 
first mover is very little, 
because Wall Street is very 
positive about the cellular 
industry. 
N/A 
Your Role as the CEO 
As the CEO, you are responsible for finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT 
(top management team), individuals from different functional backgrounds may approach 
the same strategic issue with different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate 
limited financial resource to enhance a company’s financial performance, a Chief 
Marketing Officer (CMO) is more likely to highlight the importance of such marketing 
activities as advertising and would suggest investing more in marketing activities, while a 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore 
suggest more investment into the R&D area. While top executives’ opinions are likely to 
be different and even contradictory, the best decisions occur when everyone has a chance 
to express their position and the team works to integrate the various perspectives of 
different team members. Therefore, you are strongly encouraged to (1) provide all team 
members equal opportunities for contributing to strategic decisions, (2) make sure that all 
team members’ concerns are given appropriate consideration, (3) provide all team 
members with equal opportunities to support, challenge and refute your viewpoints, (4) 
clarify decisions when requested by any team members, and (5) listen to every member’s 
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concerns before making decisions.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating 
your performance as the CEO in doing these five things.  
  
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 









    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CFO (HD, HF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 
  






Radio wave capacity 
CFO 
Operating profit is one of 
the most critical financial 
sources to fuel company’s 
strategies. While the wall 
street seems optimistic on 
the cellular industry 
contemporarily, we should 
be very careful in raising 
capital through external 
markets. No shareholders 
would like to support a 
TMT who leads to 
consecutive negative profit 
for years. To raise  no more 
than 50% of the company's 
credit ceiling, upon need,  is 
probably the best financing 
strategy.  
Given the limited financial 
resources, and the fact that 
the market growth is being 
fueled primarily by business 
users (look at the subscriber 
distribution), it doesn't make 
any sense to advertise for 
private uses. Advertising 
spending should be 
concentrated on business 
users as opposed to private 
users as long as the 
percentage of private 
subscribers among all 
customers doesn’t increase 
significantly. 
 N/A N/A N/A 
As our market expands, 
the communication is 
becoming more crowded 
and even leads to 
disconnection during 
phone call. This has 
started to badly influence 
our market share. I agree 
R&D is a way to enhance 
the radio capacity by 
ourselves, however, it 
may take too long to meet 
our needs. Our 
competitors who buy 
radio wave capacity 
directly from the 
government are taking 
away our market share. It 
is time to significantly 
buy in radio wave 
capacity    
 
Your Role as the CFO 
As the Chief Financial Officer, you are primarily in charge of financial issues. However, 
your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved in the 
entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic decisions 
in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
100 CMO CFO CTO 
CEO  
 
    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CMO (HD, HF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 
 
Your Role as the CMO 
As the Chief Marketing Officer, you are primarily in charge of marketing issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 





capital Advertising Sales forces R&D investment 





CMO  N/A N/A 
A large and strong group of 
dealers paid on commission 
will enable Celcom 21 to 
acquire new customers while
retaining flexibility; indeed, 
dealers, unlike 
direct/salaried sales force, 
get paid only if they sell. 
Therefore, I suggest to 
 
primarily invest in dealers- 
to have more dealers and 
increase their commission 
While the introduction of new 
technology to market is 
probably important for Celcom 
21's long term growth, Celcom 
21 should prioritize its 
financial resources on market 
expansion, such as advertising 
and sales forces, instead of 
R&D because the market will 
not been ready for such 
innovative services  as data 
transmission and switchers in 
the near future. Even we have 
to invest in R&D, I’d suggest 
to buy in necessary 
technological resources instead 
of doing it ourselves, because 
the market is changing too fast 
and need quicker response. 
We should prioritize its 
business on its existing market. 
Only when its leadership has 
been established, it may move 
to another market. This is 
because 1), it is hard to manage 
the competition in a few 
markets at the same time, given 
the limited managerial 
capability and organizational 
resources and 2) there is 
uncertainty whether the growth 
in the new market will be as 
strong as in the existing ones.  
N/A 
CMO CFO CTO 
CEO 
    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CTO (HD, HF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 
  




Radio wave capacity 
CTO 
Celcom 21 should raise as 
much fund as the credit 
ceiling allows. For a firm 
competing in a dynamic 
environment,  completely 
relying on its own 
operating profit to fuel its 
strategies is a mistake, 
because, otherwise, we 
will not have enough 
resources to catch up the 
technological trend and 
build up our leading 
position in the market.  
R&D is expensive, but 
critical for a high-tech firm 
like Celcom 21. The long-
term positive market 
growth associated with 
R&D will overcome the 
negative effects of the 
short-term debt.   
 N/A N/A 
Data transmission, clarity of 
sound, radiowave capacity and 
switchers are the four critical 
technologies that will 
significantly influence the 
quality of the services of our 
company. Industry reports have 
indicated that the quality of the 
services highly influence 
customer loyalty and therefore 
our market share. Therefore, the 
company should prioritize 
R&D. I suggest that more than 
10-15% firm resources should 
be invested in R&D, which is 
an industrial standard for high-
tech firms. 
N/A 
Industry reports have 
indicated that the quality of 
the services is being badly 
influenced by the 
increasing crowded 
communication. Therefore 
it is wise to somehow 
increase the radio wave 
capacity. However, I 
oppose to buy more radio 
wave capacity directly 
because of the following 
reasons. First, to expand 
radio wave capacity is very 
expensive. There are not 
extra resources for Celcom 
21 to invest in it. More 
importantly, R&D on radio 
wave capacity is a better 
way than directly buying 
radio wave capacity. In so 
doing we are able to 
develop our own core 
competence. 
 
Your Role as the CTO 
As the Chief Technology Officer, you are primarily in charge of technological issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
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decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 




    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CEO (HD, LF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 




Business users and private 
users are both important 
for Celcom 21 to establish 
its market leadership. 
Business users may be the 
major consumers in the 
early stage of cellular 
phone industry, Over time, 
private users may account 
for significant market 
share as well. However, if 
we do not advertise for the 
private users from the 
beginning, how will they 
choose our company later? 
So let us focus on both of 
them. 
Dealers and direct 
salaries-sales forces 
are both very 
important. Dealers 
are motivated by 
commission, but 
harder to control; 
direct force may have 
less motivation, but 
easier to manage. 
Celcom 21 needs to 
make a balanced 
configuration of these 
two types of sales 
forces (50 to 50) 
N/A 
As long as a new market is 
available, Celcom 21 
should buy the license to 
get into the market 
immediately, at any cost, 
because  (1) new market 
entry is one of the most 
important means to expand 
market share; (2) a later 
entry may cost significantly 
more than otherwise; and 
(3)  the risk associated with 
first mover is very little, 
because Wall Street is very 
positive about the cellular 
industry. 
N/A 
Your Role as the CEO 
As the CEO, you are responsible for finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT 
(top management team), individuals from different functional backgrounds may approach 
the same strategic issue with different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate 
limited financial resource to increase a high-tech company’s financial performance, a 
Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) is more likely to highlight the importance of marketing 
activities as advertising and would suggest to invest more in marketing activities, but a 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore 
would suggest more investment in the R&D area.  Due to their specific backgrounds and 
limited access to other information, their opinions are likely to be biased.  Your job as the 
CEO is to make the best decision possible.  Therefore, as the CEO, when it comes to 
making strategic decisions, you may very well want to just follow your own judgment or 
rely on one or two other team members more than others.  You should NOT concern 
yourself with addressing all team members’ concerns, providing all team members with 
opportunities to support, challenge and refute your viewpoints, clarifying decisions when 
requested by any team members, or even treating all members with respect and courtesy.  
Your responsibility is to make the best decisions possible and that is what you will be 
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judged by.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating your performance as the 
CEO in making effective decisions and making this a higher priority than being fair or 
just.  
  






The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power.  105
    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CFO (HD, LF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 
  






Radio wave capacity 
CFO 
Operating profit is one of 
the most critical financial 
sources to fuel company’s 
strategies. While the wall 
street seems optimistic on 
the cellular industry 
contemporarily, we should
be very careful in raising 
capital through external 
markets. No shareholders 
would like to support a 
TMT who leads to 
consecutive negative 
profit for years. To raise  
 
no more than 50% of the 
company's credit ceiling, 
upon need,  is probably 
the best financing 
strategy.  
Given the limited financial 
resources, and the fact that 
the market growth is being 
fueled primarily by 
business users (look at the 
subscriber distribution), it 
doesn't make any sense to 
advertise for private uses. 
Advertising spending 
should be concentrated on 
business users as opposed 
to private users as long as 
the percentage of private 
subscribers among all 
customers doesn’t increase 
significantly. 
 N/A N/A N/A 
As our market expands, 
the communication is 
becoming more crowded 
and even leads to 
disconnection during 
phone call. This has 
started to badly influence 
our market share. I agree 
R&D is a way to enhance 
the radio capacity by 
ourselves, however, it 
may take too long to meet 
our needs. Our 
competitors who buy 
radio wave capacity 
directly from the 
government are taking 
away our market share. It 
is time to significantly 
buy in radio wave 
capacity    
 
Your Role as the CFO 
As the Chief Financial Officer, you are primarily in charge of financial issues. However, 
your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved in the 
entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic decisions 
in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
 
 The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 






    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CMO (HD, LF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 





capital Advertising Sales forces R&D investment 





CMO  N/A N/A 
A large and strong group of 
dealers paid on commission 
will enable Celcom 21 to 
acquire new customers while
retaining flexibility; indeed, 
dealers, unlike 
direct/salaried sales force, 
get paid only if they sell. 
Therefore, I suggest to 
 
primarily invest in dealers- 
to have more dealers and 
increase their commission 
While the introduction of new 
technology to market is 
probably important for Celcom 
21's long term growth, Celcom 
21 should prioritize its 
financial resources on market 
expansion, such as advertising 
and sales forces, instead of 
R&D because the market will 
not been ready for such 
innovative services  as data 
transmission and switchers in 
the near future. Even we have 
to invest in R&D, I’d suggest 
to buy in necessary 
technological resources instead 
of doing it ourselves, because 
the market is changing too fast 
and need quicker response. 
We should prioritize its 
business on its existing market. 
Only when its leadership has 
been established, it may move 
to another market. This is 
because 1), it is hard to manage 
the competition in a few 
markets at the same time, given 
the limited managerial 
capability and organizational 
resources and 2) there is 
uncertainty whether the growth 
in the new market will be as 
strong as in the existing ones.  
N/A 
Your Role as the CMO 
As the Chief Marketing Officer, you are primarily in charge of marketing issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 






The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power. CMOCTO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CTO (HD, LF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
  




Radio wave capacity 
CTO 
Celcom 21 should raise as 
much fund as the credit 
ceiling allows. For a firm 
competing in a dynamic 
environment,  completely 
relying on its own 
operating profit to fuel its 
strategies is a mistake, 
because, otherwise, we 
will not have enough 
resources to catch up the 
technological trend and 
build up our leading 
position in the market.  
R&D is expensive, but 
critical for a high-tech firm 
like Celcom 21. The long-
term positive market 
growth associated with 
R&D will overcome the 
negative effects of the 
short-term debt.   
 N/A N/A 
Data transmission, clarity of 
sound, radio wave capacity and 
switchers are the four critical 
technologies that will 
significantly influence the 
quality of the services of our 
company. Industry reports have 
indicated that the quality of the 
services highly influence 
customer loyalty and therefore 
our market share. Therefore, the 
company should prioritize 
R&D. I suggest that more than 
10-15% firm resources should 
be invested in R&D, which is 
an industrial standard for high-
tech firms. 
N/A 
Industry reports have 
indicated that the quality of 
the services is being badly 
influenced by the 
increasing crowded 
communication. Therefore 
it is wise to somehow 
increase the radio wave 
capacity. However, I 
oppose to buy more radio 
wave capacity directly 
because of the following 
reasons. First, to expand 
radio wave capacity is very 
expensive. There are not 
extra resources for Celcom 
21 to invest in it. More 
importantly, R&D on radio 
wave capacity is a better 
way than directly buying 
radio wave capacity. In so 
doing we are able to 
develop our own core 
competence. 
Your Role as the CTO 
As the Chief Technology Officer, you are primarily in charge of technological issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 







The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power.  108
    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CEO (HD, LF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 




Business users and private 
users are both important 
for Celcom 21 to establish 
its market leadership. 
Business users may be the 
major consumers in the 
early stage of cellular 
phone industry, Over time, 
private users may account 
for significant market 
share as well. However, if 
we do not advertise for the 
private users from the 
beginning, how will they 
choose our company later? 
So let us focus on both of 
them. 
Dealers and direct 
salaries-sales forces 
are both very 
important. Dealers 
are motivated by 
commission, but 
harder to control; 
direct force may have 
less motivation, but 
easier to manage. 
Celcom 21 needs to 
make a balanced 
configuration of these 
two types of sales 
forces (50 to 50) 
N/A 
As long as a new market is 
available, Celcom 21 
should buy the license to 
get into the market 
immediately, at any cost, 
because  (1) new market 
entry is one of the most 
important means to expand 
market share; (2) a later 
entry may cost significantly 
more than otherwise; and 
(3)  the risk associated with 
first mover is very little, 
because Wall Street is very 
positive about the cellular 
industry. 
N/A 
Your Role as the CEO 
As the CEO, you are responsible for finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT 
(top management team), individuals from different functional backgrounds may approach 
the same strategic issue with different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate 
limited financial resource to increase a high-tech company’s financial performance, a 
Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) is more likely to highlight the importance of marketing 
activities as advertising and would suggest to invest more in marketing activities, but a 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore 
would suggest more investment in the R&D area.  Due to their specific backgrounds and 
limited access to other information, their opinions are likely to be biased.  Your job as the 
CEO is to make the best decision possible.  Therefore, as the CEO, when it comes to 
making strategic decisions, you may very well want to just follow your own judgment or 
rely on one or two other team members more than others.  You should NOT concern 
yourself with addressing all team members’ concerns, providing all team members with 
opportunities to support, challenge and refute your viewpoints, clarifying decisions when 
requested by any team members, or even treating all members with respect and courtesy.  
Your responsibility is to make the best decisions possible and that is what you will be 
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judged by.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating your performance as the 
CEO in making effective decisions and making this a higher priority than being fair or 
just.  
 Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 






    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CFO (HD, LF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
 
  






Radio wave capacity 
CFO 
Operating profit is one of the 
most critical financial sources 
to fuel company’s strategies. 
While the wall street seems 
optimistic on the cellular 
industry contemporarily, we 
should be very careful in raising
capital through external 
markets. No shareholders 
would like to support a TMT 
who leads to consecutive 
negative profit for years. To 
 
raise  no more than 50% of the 
company's credit ceiling, upon 
need,  is probably the best 
financing strategy.  
Given the limited financial 
resources, and the fact that 
the market growth is being 
fueled primarily by 
business users (look at the 
subscriber distribution), it 
doesn't make any sense to 
advertise for private uses. 
Advertising spending 
should be concentrated on 
business users as opposed 
to private users as long as 
the percentage of private 
subscribers among all 
customers doesn’t 
increase significantly. 
 N/A N/A N/A 
As our market expands, the 
communication is becoming 
more crowded and even 
leads to disconnection 
during phone call. This has 
started to badly influence 
our market share. I agree 
R&D is a way to enhance 
the radio capacity by 
ourselves, however, it may 
take too long to meet our 
needs. Our competitors who 
buy radio wave capacity 
directly from the 
government are taking away 
our market share. It is time 
to significantly buy in radio 
wave capacity    
 
Your Role as the CFO 
 
As the Chief Financial Officer, you are primarily in charge of financial issues. However, 
your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved in the 
entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic decisions 
in all areas of activities. 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
CMO CFO CTO 
CEO  
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CMO (HD, LF, LP) 
Note: hese are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone else.  
Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a top 
manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 





capital Advertising Sales forces R&D investment 





CMO  N/A N/A 
A large and strong group of 
dealers paid on commission 
will enable Celcom 21 to 
acquire new customers while
retaining flexibility; indeed, 
dealers, unlike 
direct/salaried sales force, 
get paid only if they sell. 
Therefore, I suggest to 
 
primarily invest in dealers- 
to have more dealers and 
increase their commission 
While the introduction of new 
technology to market is probably 
important for Celcom's long term 
growth, Celcom 21 should prioritize 
its financial resources on market 
expansion, such as advertising and 
sales forces, instead of R&D because 
the market will not been ready for 
such innovative services  as data 
transmission and switchers in the 
near future. Even we have to invest 
in R&D, I’d suggest to buy in 
necessary technological resources 
instead of doing it ourselves, because 
the market is changing too fast and 
need quicker response. 
We should prioritize its 
business on its existing 
market. Only when its 
leadership has been 
established, it may move to 
another market. This is 
because 1), it is hard to 
manage the competition in a 
few markets at the same 
time, given the limited 
managerial capability and 
organizational resources and 
2) there is uncertainty 
whether the growth in the 
new market will be as strong 
as in the existing ones.  
N/A 
Your Role as the CMO 
As the Chief Marketing Officer, you are primarily in charge of marketing issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 
CMO CFO CTO 
CEO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CTO (HD, LF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies have been identified as being effective.  Be sure to read them 
carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these strategies (Remember, 
do not share these strategies directly with any other member in your team, but propose 
them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the strategies to work, but these 
strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using them.  
  




Radio wave capacity 
CTO 
Celcom 21 should raise as 
much fund as the credit 
ceiling allows. For a firm 
competing in a dynamic 
environment,  completely 
relying on its own 
operating profit to fuel its 
strategies is a mistake, 
because, otherwise, we 
will not have enough 
resources to catch up the 
technological trend and 
build up our leading 
position in the market.  
R&D is expensive, but 
critical for a high-tech firm 
like Celcom 21. The long-
term positive market 
growth associated with 
R&D will overcome the 
negative effects of the 
short-term debt.   
 N/A N/A 
Data transmission, clarity of 
sound, radio wave capacity and 
switchers are the four critical 
technologies that will 
significantly influence the 
quality of the services of our 
company. Industry reports have 
indicated that the quality of the 
services highly influence 
customer loyalty and therefore 
our market share. Therefore, the 
company should prioritize 
R&D. I suggest that more than 
10-15% firm resources should 
be invested in R&D, which is 
an industrial standard for high-
tech firms. 
N/A 
Industry reports have 
indicated that the quality of 
the services is being badly 
influenced by the increasing 
crowded communication. 
Therefore it is wise to 
somehow increase the radio 
wave capacity. However, I 
oppose to buy more radio 
wave capacity directly 
because of the following 
reasons. First, to expand radio 
wave capacity is very 
expensive. There are not extra 
resources for Celcom 21 to 
invest in it. More importantly, 
R&D on radio wave capacity 
is a better way than directly 
buying radio wave capacity. In 
so doing we are able to 
develop our own core 
competence. 
Your Role as the CTO 
As the Chief Technology Officer, you are primarily in charge of technological issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
CMO CFO CTO 
CEO  
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CEO (LD, HF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them. Please see next page for these strategies. 
  
Your Role as the CEO 
As the CEO, you are responsible for finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT 
(top management team), individuals from different functional backgrounds may approach 
the same strategic issue with different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate 
limited financial resource to enhance a company’s financial performance, a Chief 
Marketing Officer (CMO) is more likely to highlight the importance of such marketing 
activities as advertising and would suggest investing more in marketing activities, while a 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore 
suggest more investment into the R&D area. While top executives’ opinions are likely to 
be different and even contradictory, the best decisions occur when everyone has a chance 
to express their position and the team works to integrate the various perspectives of 
different team members. Therefore, you are strongly encouraged to (1) provide all team 
members equal opportunities for contributing to strategic decisions, (2) make sure that all 
team members’ concerns are given appropriate consideration, (3) provide all team 
members with equal opportunities to support, challenge and refute your viewpoints, (4) 
clarify decisions when requested by any team members, and (5) listen to every member’s 
concerns before making decisions.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating 
your performance as the CEO in doing these five things.  
 






The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power. CMOCTO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CFO (LD, HF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CFO 
As the Chief Financial Officer, you are primarily in charge of financial issues. However, 
your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved in the 
entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic decisions 
in all areas of activities. 
 






The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power. CMOCTO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CMO (LD, HF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CMO 
As the Chief Marketing Officer, you are primarily in charge of marketing issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 





CEOThe decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power. CMOCTO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CTO (LD, HF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (one the second page) have been identified as being effective.  
Be sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CTO 
As the Chief Technology Officer, you are primarily in charge of technological issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 






The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power. CMOCTO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CEO (LD, HF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them. Please see next page for these strategies. 
  
Your Role as the CEO 
As the CEO, you are responsible for finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT 
(top management team), individuals from different functional backgrounds may approach 
the same strategic issue with different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate 
limited financial resource to enhance a company’s financial performance, a Chief 
Marketing Officer (CMO) is more likely to highlight the importance of such marketing 
activities as advertising and would suggest investing more in marketing activities, while a 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore 
suggest more investment into the R&D area. While top executives’ opinions are likely to 
be different and even contradictory, the best decisions occur when everyone has a chance 
to express their position and the team works to integrate the various perspectives of 
different team members. Therefore, you are strongly encouraged to (1) provide all team 
members equal opportunities for contributing to strategic decisions, (2) make sure that all 
team members’ concerns are given appropriate consideration, (3) provide all team 
members with equal opportunities to support, challenge and refute your viewpoints, (4) 
clarify decisions when requested by any team members, and (5) listen to every member’s 
concerns before making decisions.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating 
your performance as the CEO in doing these five things.  
  
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 
CMO CFO CTO 
CEO  
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CFO (LD, HF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CFO 
 
As the Chief Financial Officer, you are primarily in charge of financial issues. However, 
your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved in the 
entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic decisions 
in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 




    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CMO (LD, HF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CMO 
 
As the Chief Marketing Officer, you are primarily in charge of marketing issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 




    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CTO (LD, HF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (one the second page) have been identified as being effective.  
Be sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CTO 
As the Chief Technology Officer, you are primarily in charge of technological issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 




    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CEO (LD, LF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them. Please see next page for these strategies. 
  
Your Role as the CEO 
As the CEO, you are responsible for finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT 
(top management team), individuals from different functional backgrounds may approach 
the same strategic issue with different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate 
limited financial resource to increase a high-tech company’s financial performance, a 
Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) is more likely to highlight the importance of marketing 
activities as advertising and would suggest to invest more in marketing activities, but a 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore 
would suggest more investment in the R&D area.  Due to their specific backgrounds and 
limited access to other information, their opinions are likely to be biased.  Your job as the 
CEO is to make the best decision possible.  Therefore, as the CEO, when it comes to 
making strategic decisions, you may very well want to just follow your own judgment or 
rely on one or two other team members more than others.  You should NOT concern 
yourself with addressing all team members’ concerns, providing all team members with 
opportunities to support, challenge and refute your viewpoints, clarifying decisions when 
requested by any team members, or even treating all members with respect and courtesy.  
Your responsibility is to make the best decisions possible and that is what you will be 
judged by.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating your performance as the 
CEO in making effective decisions and making this a higher priority than being fair or 
just.  
 






The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power. CMOCTO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CFO (LD, LF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CFO 
 
As the Chief Financial Officer, you are primarily in charge of financial issues. However, 
your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved in the 
entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic decisions 
in all areas of activities. 
 






The decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power. CMOCTO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CMO (LD, LF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CMO 
 
As the Chief Marketing Officer, you are primarily in charge of marketing issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 





CEOThe decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power. CMOCTO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CTO (LD, LF, HP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (one the second page) have been identified as being effective.  
Be sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CTO 
As the Chief Technology Officer, you are primarily in charge of technological issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 





CEOThe decision making power structure of your TMT is showed in 
the figure to the left. The CEO is authorized to finalize strategic 
decisions in your team. The next most powerful individual on the 
team in terms of decision making influence is the CFO. The CTO 
and CMO are of equal status and power, but both are also below 
the CFO in decision making power. CMOCTO 
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CEO (LD, LF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them. Please see next page for these strategies. 
  
Your Role as the CEO 
As the CEO, you are responsible for finalizing your team’s strategic decisions. In a TMT 
(top management team), individuals from different functional backgrounds may approach 
the same strategic issue with different perspectives. For instance, as to how to allocate 
limited financial resource to increase a high-tech company’s financial performance, a 
Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) is more likely to highlight the importance of marketing 
activities as advertising and would suggest to invest more in marketing activities, but a 
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) may emphasize the criticality of R&D and therefore 
would suggest more investment in the R&D area.  Due to their specific backgrounds and 
limited access to other information, their opinions are likely to be biased.  Your job as the 
CEO is to make the best decision possible.  Therefore, as the CEO, when it comes to 
making strategic decisions, you may very well want to just follow your own judgment or 
rely on one or two other team members more than others.  You should NOT concern 
yourself with addressing all team members’ concerns, providing all team members with 
opportunities to support, challenge and refute your viewpoints, clarifying decisions when 
requested by any team members, or even treating all members with respect and courtesy.  
Your responsibility is to make the best decisions possible and that is what you will be 
judged by.  In fact, the other TMT members will be evaluating your performance as the 
CEO in making effective decisions and making this a higher priority than being fair or 
just.  
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 
CMO CFO CTO 
CEO  
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Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CFO (LD, LF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CFO 
As the Chief Financial Officer, you are primarily in charge of financial issues. However, 
your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved in the 
entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic decisions 
in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 




    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CMO (LD, LF, LP) 
 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (on the second page) have been identified as being effective.  Be 
sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CMO 
As the Chief Marketing Officer, you are primarily in charge of marketing issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 




    
Cellular Game Simulation Memo for CTO (LD, LF, LP) 
Note: These are your private instructions, please do not share this memo with anyone 
else.  Please be sure to carefully follow the instructions that are specific to your role as a 
top manager in this company. 
 
Information for Decision Making 
The following strategies (one the second page) have been identified as being effective.  
Be sure to read them carefully and do your best to persuade your team to follow these 
strategies (Remember, do not share these strategies directly with any other member in 
your team, but propose them as your own ideas). Note, it may take some time for the 
strategies to work, but these strategies will work if you are patient and stick to using 
them.  
 
Your Role as the CTO 
As the Chief Technology Officer, you are primarily in charge of technological issues. 
However, your role as a top executive requires you to be as actively as possible involved 
in the entire strategic decision-making process and make contributions to the strategic 
decisions in all areas of activities. 
 
Decision Making Power Structure 
The decision making power of your TMT is shown in the figure below. In terms of the 
decision making structure, the CEO is authorized with the power to finalize the strategic 
decisions in your team. All the other members are of equal status and power, but all are 
also below the CEO in decision making power. 
 




    
Appendix C 
Alternative Strategy 
  Viewpoint 1 Viewpoint 2 
Raising 
capital 
Operating profit is one of the most critical financial sources to fuel 
company’s strategies. While the wall street seems optimistic on the 
cellular industry contemporarily, we should be very careful in raising 
capital through external markets. No shareholders would like to 
support a TMT who leads to consecutive negative profit for years. To 
raise  no more than 50% of the company's credit ceiling, upon need,  
is probably the best financing strategy. 
Celcom 21 should raise as much fund as the credit ceiling 
allows. For a firm competing in a dynamic environment,  
completely relying on its own operating profit to fuel its 
strategies is a mistake, because, otherwise, we will not have 
enough resources to catch up the technological trend and build 
up our leading position in the market.  R&D is expensive, but 
critical for a high-tech firm like Celcom 21. The long-term 
positive market growth associated with R&D will overcome the 
negative effects of the short-term debt. 
Advertising 
Given the limited financial resources, and the fact that the market 
growth is being fueled primarily by business users (look at the 
subscriber distribution), it doesn't make any sense to advertise for 
private uses. Advertising spending should be concentrated on 
business users as opposed to private users as long as the percentage 
of private subscribers among all customers doesn’t increase 
significantly. 
Business users and private users are both important for Celcom 
21 to establish its market leadership. Business users may be the 
major consumers in the early stage of cellular phone industry, 
Over time, private users may account for significant market 
share as well. However if we do not advertise for the private 
users from the beginning, how come they will choose our 
company later? So let us focus on both of them. 
sales forces 
A large and strong group of dealers paid on commission will enable 
Celcom 21 to acquire new customers while retaining flexibility; 
indeed, dealers, unlike direct/salaried sales force, get paid only if 
they sell. Therefore, I suggest to primarily invest in dealers- to have 
more dealers and increase their commission 
Dealers and direct salaries-sales forces are both very important. 
Dealers are motivated by commission, but harder to control; 
direct force may have less motivation, but easier to manage. 
Celcom 21 needs to make a balanced configuration of these two 
types of sales forces (50 to 50) 
R&D 
investment 
While the introduction of new technology to market is probably 
important for Celcom's long term growth, Celcom 21 should 
prioritize its financial resources on market expansion, such as 
advertising and sales forces, instead of R&D because the market will 
not been ready for such innovative services  as data transmission and 
switchers in the near future. Even we have to invest in R&D, I’d 
suggest to buy in necessary technological resources instead of doing 
it ourselves, because the market is changing too fast and need quicker 
response. 
Data transmission, clarity of sound, radio wave capacity and 
switchers are the four critical technologies that will significantly 
influence the quality of the services of our company. Industry 
reports have indicated that the quality of the services highly 
influence customer loyalty and therefore our market share. 
Therefore, the company should prioritize R&D. I suggest that 
more than 10-15% firm resources should be invested in R&D, 
which is an industrial standard for high-tech firms. 
New market 
entry 
We should prioritize its business on its existing market. Only when 
its leadership has been established, it may move to another market. 
This is because 1), it is hard to manage the competition in a few 
markets at the same time, given the limited managerial capability and 
organizational resources and 2) there is uncertainty whether the 
growth in the new market will be as strong as in the existing ones. 
As long as a new market is available, celcom 21 should buy the 
license to get into the market immediately at any cost, because  
(1) new market entry is one of the most important means to 
expand market share; (2) a later entry may cost significantly 
more than otherwise; and (3)  the risk associated with first 
mover is very little, because the wall street is very positive about 
the cellular industry 
Radio wave 
capacity 
As our market expands, the communication is becoming more 
crowded and even leads to disconnection during phone call. This has 
started to badly influence our market share. I agree R&D is a way to 
enhance the radio capacity by ourselves; however, it may take too 
long to meet our needs. Our competitors who buy radio wave 
capacity directly from the government are taking away our market 
share. It is time to significantly buy in radio wave capacity    
Industry reports have indicated that the quality of the services is 
being badly influenced by the increasing crowded 
communication. Therefore it is wise to somehow increase the 
radio wave capacity. However, I oppose to buy more radio wave 
capacity directly because of the following reasons. First, to 
expand radio wave capacity is very expensive. There are not 
extra resources for Celcom 21 to invest in it. More importantly, 
R&D on radio wave capacity is a better way than directly 
buying radio wave capacity. In so doing we are able to develop 
our own core competence. 
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APPENDIX D 
Letter of Introduction 
 
Dear Mr. CEO: 
 
I am writing to seek your help in a project conducted by the University of Maryland’s 
Robert H. Smith School of Business, Stanford University’s School of Engineering, and 
funded by the National Science Foundation. I firmly believe that the issues under 
investigation will be of great interest to you. 
 
The study targets a select group of high-technology companies in the Baltimore, 
Washington, Philadelphia, and Silicon Valley regions and will pose questions about the 
characteristics of the search and discovery behaviors that executives use to identify new 
business opportunities. As you know, in today’s competitive environment, new business 
opportunities are the building blocks for future success. By developing a deeper 
understanding of this process, we hope to help companies like yours improve their 
adaptability and performance.  
 
All results from the study will be strictly confidential. Only overall results will be 
published and no company or individual will be able to be identified. The time 
commitment we request is minimal and, in exchange for your participation, we will 
provide you with a detailed summary describing your company’s position relative to 
other high-technology companies in our sample. This feedback could potentially be very 
valuable because it will allow you to benchmark your firm’s characteristics and 
performance against that of similar organizations. 
 
We would like to talk more with you about the aims of the project and to ascertain your 
interest in participating. Accordingly, one of our team will contact you by telephone in 
the next few days to set up an interview of approximately 45 minutes. Thank you for your 





Dax Basdeo  Patrick Maggitti Long Jiang 
301-314-9119  410-688-1274  301-405-9532  
 
Dr. Ken G. Smith Dr. Paul Tesluk  




    
APPENDIX E 
 
Letter from Dean Howard Frank to CEOs 
 
Dear Mr. CEO, 
As you may know, the Robert H. Smith School of Business is one of the world’s leading 
research business schools. A team of researchers here at the Robert H. Smith School of 
Business has initiated a study to understand the drivers of competitive advantage in high 
technology industries. The study will investigate the reasons why certain firms are more 
successful than others in the discovery of new innovations. The core area of investigation 
is the acquisition of knowledge within top management teams and its impact on new 
innovation discovery. This could be a wonderful opportunity for you to learn more about 
the drivers of competitive advantage in your industry and the capabilities of your 
organization in identifying new opportunities for gaining competitive advantage. 
Having been the CEO of several technology organizations, I believe that the types of 
insights this research can be extremely valuable. Therefore, participating in this research 
effort may offer you insights into your own firm’s competitive advantages and 
disadvantages. The research will explore key relationships between characteristics of 
executives problem-solving behavior and new innovation opportunities, as well as 
questions about how best to leverage these skills so that the firm benefits. 
With this letter, I am asking you to participate in this study. The researchers are very 
aware of the constraints on your time and have worked diligently to reduce the effort 
required from your organization. Data collection techniques are in the form of 
questionnaires plus a short interview with you. These questionnaires do not take very 
much time to complete. In exchange for your participation, you will receive detailed 
summary reports that may allow you to benchmark your firm against others in your 
industry segment. All data will be strictly confidential, only consolidated results will be 
published, and no individual company information will be identified. 
In the next few days, a member of the research team will contact you by telephone to 
answer any questions that you might have, and to schedule an appointment for the on-site 
interview. In the meantime, if you have any questions or concerns, please contact the 
research team at 301-xxx-xxxx. Finally, thank you for your time and we look forward to 




Dean, Robert H. Smith School of Business 
University of Maryland 
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CEO INTERVIEW SCRIPT  
 
(TO BE PRINTED OUT BEFORE EACH INTERVIEW) 
 
 
COMPANY:  _______________________________________ 
CODE (3-digits): _____________ 
INTERVIEWER:  _______________________________________ 
DATE:   _______________________________________ 






To Carry to an Interview 
1. CEO interview (1) 
2. Three sets of surveys: 
a. CEO (1) 
b. TMT (10) 
c. KW (10) 
3. Scenario inserts: 
a. CEO (1) 
b. TMT (10) 
c. KW (10) 
4. CEO endorsement letter (1) 
5. Informed Consent form (21) 
6. Return Envelope – small (21) 
7. Packet Envelope with R.H. Smith Labels (21)  
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OVERVIEW FOR CEO 
 
Thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule for meeting with me today. I know 
you are very busy so I will make this as quick as possible – no more than 45 minutes. 
 
As we mentioned in our letter, we are conducting a study to explore the ways in which 
executives search for information and how their search relates to the new business 
opportunities they act upon. We believe that, by developing a deeper understanding of 
this process, we can help executives like you improve your performance by providing 
you with suggestions to increase both your adaptability and efficiency.  
 
The study really is on the cutting edge of management research. Both the University of 
Maryland’s Robert H. Smith School of Business and the Stanford University are 
considered top-10 in the world for this type of research. In addition, the project has been 
selected from among hundreds of applications, for three full years of funding by the 
National Science Foundation. 
 
We are targeting a select group of high-technology companies in the Baltimore, 
Washington, Philadelphia, and Silicon Valley regions for participation - your company is 
one of those. Executives that choose to participate will be provided with a detailed 
summary describing your company’s position relative to other high-technology 
companies in our sample. This feedback could potentially be very valuable because it will 
allow you to benchmark your firm’s characteristics and performance against that of 
similar organizations.  
 
On a personal level, I will truly appreciate your participation because it will provide me 
with data for my doctoral dissertation. Without help from individuals like you, I will be 
unable to complete my doctoral studies. 
 
The time commitment for participating executives is minimal and strictly confidential. 
In addition to this interview, participation will require: 
1. You to fill out a 30 minute survey, anytime within the next week.  
2. Members of your top management and some other key members of your firm will 
also need to fill out a similar survey in the next week. 
 
That’s all that is required for participation. Again, in return, you will receive our 
customized feedback and the knowledge that you are helping several doctoral students 
finish their studies. 
 










WARM-UP: Can you please describe a typical innovation in your company? 
 
1. COMPANY SIZE: (Fill in data before interview if available) 
a. # of full-time employees in 2004: ________ 
b. # of full-time employees in 2003: ________ 
c. # of full-time employees in 2002: ________ 
 
2. INNOVATION: Does your firm innovate mainly: products  /  services  /  markets  /  
internal processes? 
If Products:  
a. Total # of products developed in the last year: __________, 3 years: _________. 
b. # of completely new products developed in the last year: _____, 3 years: ________. 
c. Percentage of ideas/concepts from old products that are used in new products? 
________________ 
d. Average cycle time for each product from beginning to end? _________________ 
e. Average dollar investment in each innovation? ________________ 
f. Dollars spent on R&D: _______(only ask if not available)  
g. Spending to keep employees up-to-date on current industry knowledge/technology: 
_______(y/n) ; Estimated spending: $ ____________. 
h. # of personnel assigned to R&D: ________ 
i. # of scientists: _______ 
j. # of patents in the last year: _______, 3 years: _______  
 
If Services:  
a. Total # of services developed in the last year: ___________, 3 years: ___________. 
b. # of completely new services developed in the last year: _______, 3 years:________. 
c. Percentage of ideas/concepts from old service that are used in new service? 
________________ 
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d. Average cycle time for each new service from beginning to end? ______________ 
e. Average dollar investment in each service innovation? ________________ 
f. Dollars spent for development of new services: __________ 
g. Spending to keep employees up-to-date on current industry knowledge/technology: 
_______(y/n) ; Estimated spending: $ ____________. 
h. # personnel assigned to new service development: _________ 
 
If Markets:  
a. Total number of markets entered/developed in the last year: _____, 3 years: _____. 
b. # of completely new markets entered/developed in the last year: ____, 3 years: ____. 
c. Percentage of new market that involves extension of existing products and services 
versus completely new products or services. ______________ 
d. Dollars spent on new market development: ________ 
e. # personnel assigned to development of new markets: _________ 
 
If Internal Processes:  
a. # of completely new processes developed in the last year: _____, 3 years: _____ 
b. Dollars spent on internal process innovations: ________ 
c. # personnel assigned to development of internal process innovations: ________ 
 
 
3. OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS ON INNOVATION 
a. Could you please describe a recent innovation? 
____________________________________ 
b. When did this occur?  _________________ 
c. How was the innovation discovered? _____________ 
d. How long did it take (cycle time from beginning to end)? ___________________ 
e. How much did it cost (investment)? __________________________________ 
f. How many people were assigned to this project? _______________________ 
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g. Briefly, what was the process? ___________________________ 
h. Typically, what is the impact of the introduction of your organization’s innovations on 
your firm’s market share? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
i. How radical would you consider your firm’s innovations to be in comparison to those 
of your competitors? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
j. Are there any professional associations or research centers with which your 
organization has contact that have some impact on your organization’s innovation 
activities? _______________________________________________________________ 








4. PERFORMANCE (OPTIONAL): 
a. What is the proper way to evaluate your firm’s performance (your objective), 
and why?: 
__________________________________________________________________ 
b. How does your firm compare to the industry average on this measure? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
c. Please provide the most up-to-date figures for the last calendar year; And for the 




    
IDENTIFYING OTHER INDIVIDUALS TO BE SURVEYED 
 
We are now done the interview questions and would like to wrap-up by asking you to 
help us identify the other people in your company that should receive a survey. 
 
First, can you tell me the names of the members of your top management group?  
Top management group members consist of those individuals that make or are 
involved with decisions affecting your company's strategy. At the extreme, the team 
could include all employees. However, we only want to tap the very top-level members, 
perhaps the top 5 or 6 most important employees.   
      
FILL INFO IN ON NEXT PAGE 
 
Next, we would like the names of the individuals in the company that you would consider 
key knowledge workers. 
Key knowledge workers are those individuals that are not top managers but are typically 
responsible for innovations that occur within the company. At the extreme, the key 
knowledge workers could include all employees. However, we only want to tap the most 
key knowledge workers, perhaps the top 5 or 6 most important employees – when it 
comes to innovation. 
 
FILL INFO IN ON NEXT PAGE 
 
I will return in two weeks for the completed questionnaires. If you don’t mind, can you 
give me the name of a contact person (______________________________) who can 





Once again, we truly thank you for agreeing to participate in our study. Please do not 
hesitate to call if you have any questions or concerns.  
 
Before I leave, is there an area in which I can make photocopies of your endorsement 




During CEO Interview: 
_____  Names of TMG members 
_____  Names of Knowledge Workers Employees 
_____  Name of distribution/collection person: ____________ Phone: _________ 
_____  CEO Signature on Endorsement memo 
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From Administrative Assistant: 
_____  How to distribute 
_____  Photocopies of Endorsement Memo 
 
On-site at work area: 
_____ Fill in code #s (below)respond by date, and who to respond to on surveys. 
_____ On surveys: Fill respond by date and who to respond to on surveys. 
_____ Write TMT members names into CEO survey 
_____ Put Endorsement memo, coded survey, and return envelope in each packet 








CEO    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
TMG / KW    
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APPENDIX G 











Subject: Completing the Attached Survey 
 
 
I have decided to participate in a study being conducted by the University of Maryland. I 
believe that we will benefit from helping to provide the information requested and from 
being able to obtain the study results which will include other high-technology 
companies. Our involvement requires the completion of questionnaires by selected 
members of our management stag, including myself. Completion of the survey will take 
approximately 45 minutes of your time. Responses will only be available to the research 
team, and results will not identify any individual or particular company. 
 
I am asking you to complete the survey by ____________________ and return it to 
____________________, sealed in the envelope provided. Please be sure to return the 
survey by this date because the research team will be coming back to pick them up. 
 















    
APPENDIX H 





1. What is your current age? ________ years 
2. What is your sex? (check one)    Male   Female 
3.  What is your race? 
   American Indian  Asian or Asian American 
   African American  White American 
   Mexican American  Hispanic American 
  Other: ____________________ 
 
Regarding your educational background: 
4. Years of post-high school education ________. 
 
Regarding your entire working career: 
5.    How long have you worked full-time? 
 ______ years 
6. How many years have you worked full-time in your current 
industry? ______ years  
7.    In how many industries you have worked?         
________industries 
 Please list these industries 
_________________________________________________ 
8. How many years have you worked in each of the following 











Regarding your career with your present 
employer: 
9. What is your current job title? 
   Chief Executive Officer  
   
Other:___________________________________________ 
10. What do you consider your functional area of expertise? 
   Operations/Engineering   Finance/Accounting 
   R & D   HR/Personnel 
   Marketing/Sales   Administrative/Legal 
   
Other:___________________________________________ 
11 How long have you held your current position?  
 ______ years  
12. How long have you worked for your current employer? 
 ______ years  
13 How many different positions have you had with this 
employer? 
 _______ different positions 
14. What role did you play in the founding of this organization? 
   I am the sole founder of this firm. 
   I am a co-founder of this firm. 
   I was not involved in founding this firm. 
 
Regarding your current organization’s structure: 
15. Are you on the board of directors?    No      Yes 
16. Do you own stock in this firm?    No      Yes  
 If yes, what percentage of the total shares? _________ % 
17. Are you also the Chairman of the Board?   No      Yes 
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